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LEGAL CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND THE
HALF-EMPIRICAL ATTITUDE
Anya Bernstein†

Legal writers have recently turned to corpus linguistics to
interpret legal texts. Corpus linguistics, a social-science methodology, provides a sophisticated way to analyze large data
sets of language use. Legal proponents have touted it as giving empirical grounding to claims about ordinary language,
which pervade legal interpretation. But legal corpus linguistics cannot deliver on that promise because it ignores the crucial contexts in which legal language is produced, interpreted,
and deployed.
First, legal corpus linguistics neglects the relevant legal
context—the conditions that give legal language authority. Because of this, legal corpus studies’ evidence about language
use perversely obscures and misstates the issues legal interpreters face. Second, legal corpus linguistics also overlooks
the relevant institutional context—the way legal language is
produced by particular speakers, taken up by particular audiences, and formulated in particular genres. By unrealistically
treating language as undifferentiated, legal corpus work
imagines a communicative world that is not reflected in its
own data.
The underlying problem, I show, is a mismatch of method
with goal. Corpus linguistics in linguistics makes an empirical
claim: that its analysis illuminates truths about the language
in the corpus. Legal corpus linguistics, in contrast, uses empirical methods to support a normative claim: that its analysis
ought to influence the interpretation of legal texts. Treating
normative claims as though they were empirical findings constitutes what I call a half-empirical attitude. Because of it,
legal corpus work rests empirical results on fictional foundations. At the same time, I suggest ways that legal corpus
linguistics could be useful to legal theory—if it embraces the
other half of an empirical attitude.
† Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School; JD Yale Law School, PhD
(Anthropology) The University of Chicago. For detailed comments, I thank Neal
Goldfarb, Stefan Th. Gries, Lawrence Solan, Brian Slocum, Glen Staszewski, and
Evan Zoldan. Thanks also to workshop participants at the University of Chicago
Law School, Michigan State University College of Law, Brooklyn Law School,
Chicago-Kent College of Law, and SUNY Buffalo Law School, who gave helpful
comments on various versions and offshoots of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Empirical inquiry has come to legal interpretation—haltingly. Traditionally, interpretive writing has been haunted by a
host of presumptions: judges routinely make claims about
things like ordinary speakers, rational Congresses, and realworld facts, just on their own say-so.1 In recent years, though,
scholars have shown a new interest in the realities underlying
such legal fictions. This Article assesses one such area: legal
corpus linguistics.2 While still unfamiliar to a broad public,
legal corpus linguistics has stepped into a limelight of sorts,
with ever more scholars and judges vocally promoting it.3 The
1
See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 2027, 2053 (2005) (noting that courts are “bankrupt . . . when they must
actually decide just what makes ordinary meaning ordinary”); Abbe R. Gluck,
What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory Interpretation, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 610 (“[O]utside of the administrative deference context, the
Court has shown virtually no interest in linking how Congress really works to the
rest of its interpretive doctrines . . . .”); Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162
U. PA. L. REV. 59, 61 (2013) (showing that “Supreme Court . . . opinions are chockfull of . . . general statements of fact about the world” based on no evidence).
2
There are also other empirical inquiries underway, which are not my focus
here. See infra Part V.
3
For examples of scholarship, see, for example Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C.
Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 788 (2018) (noting that
“corpus linguistics . . . can help to answer . . . empirical questions” about the
ordinary meaning of the law); Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United
States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 443 (2018) (using corpus linguistics analysis to
determine “whether the modern understanding of the term ‘officer’ is consistent
with the term’s original public meaning”); James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert,
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approach draws on methodologies in the academic discipline of
linguistics that evaluate large data sets of text, which exceed
the experience or intuitions of any single person. Proponents
aim to give empirical heft to the claims about ordinary language that pervade legal interpretation theories and opinions.
Indeed, legal corpus linguistics has been promoted as a “scientific” answer to the question of legal meaning.4
I offer a different view.5 I argue that legal corpus linguistics
has hindered its own ability to yield empirically reliable results
by neglecting something crucial to linguistics research: communicative context. Because of that, legal corpus studies beAdvancing Law and Corpus Linguistics: Importing Principles and Practices from
Survey and Content-Analysis Methodologies to Improve Corpus Design and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1589, 1589 (2017) (“[C]orpus linguistics has much to offer
legal interpretation.”); Friedemann Vogel, Hanjo Hamann & Isabelle Gauer, Computer-Assisted Legal Linguistics: Corpus Analysis as a New Tool for Legal Studies,
43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1340, 1340 (2018) (synthesizing research on corpus linguistics and introducing “computer-assisted legal linguistics”); James A. Heilpern,
Dialects of Art: A Corpus-Based Approach to Technical Term of Art Determinations
in Statutes, 58 JURIMETRICS 377, 377 (2018) (“The emerging discipline of law and
corpus linguistics now provides practitioners, expert witnesses, and judges with
new tools to directly analyze the ordinary meaning of a word within an industry . . . .”); James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical,
126 YALE L.J. F. 21, 21 (2016) (advocating for “the use of corpus linguistics to
determine original public meaning”); Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not
a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning,
2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1919 (2010) (proposing “a corpus-based approach to
resolving questions of lexical ambiguity”). BYU Law School now holds an annual
conference devoted to legal corpus linguistics. See Law & Corpus Linguistics, BYU
LAW, https://corpusconference.byu.edu/2020-home/ [https://perma.cc/6W9WULH5] (last visited Nov. 23, 2020). For judicial opinions, see, for example Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
legal corpus linguistic research on the meaning of “search” at the time of the
founding); Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 306 F. Supp. 3d 44,
68 n.5 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d and remanded, 934 F.3D 649 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing
to the Corpus of Historical American English); Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930
F.3d 429, 439 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 838–39 (Mich. 2016); State v.
Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1271 (Utah 2015) (Lee, Assoc. C.J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); State v. Canton, 308 P.3d 517, 523 (Utah 2013).
4
Brief of Professors Clark D. Cunningham & Professor Jesse Egbert as
Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 28, In re Trump, 958 F.3d 274 (4th
Cir. 2020) (No. 18–2486).
5
I am not the first to critique legal corpus linguistics, and I build on other
work. See, e.g., Evan C. Zoldan, Corpus Linguistics and the Dream of Objectivity,
50 SETON HALL L. REV. 401, 401 (2019) (arguing that “corpus linguistics does not
live up to its promise to make legal interpretation more objective”); John S. Ehrett,
Against Corpus Linguistics, 108 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 50, 50 (2019) (arguing against
judicial use of corpus linguistics and highlighting the “dangers” such use poses).
This Article is the first, however, to explain in detail how legal corpus linguistics
differs from its parent discipline, and to show why legal corpus linguistics’ selective use of linguistics methodology undermines its own claims to empiricism.
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come relevant to legal interpretation only if we accept a host of
fictions—for instance, that statutory language resembles newspaper language, or that statutes are primarily commands from
a sovereign to private persons, or that ordinary language use
determines whether a precedent controls a subsequent case.
Ignoring communicative context undermines legal corpus linguistics’ ability to get reliable or relevant results. In contrast to
the empirical work of corpus linguistics in linguistics, legal
corpus linguistics tends to take a half-empirical attitude.
Below, I first introduce corpus linguistics as it works in
linguistics, then present the thinner version that has made its
way into law.6 I argue that, unlike its parent discipline, legal
corpus linguistics tends to over-focus on one very small slice of
reality—word frequency—ignoring the larger contexts that give
those words, and interpretive inquiry itself, meaning.7 For one
thing, legal context determines what authority a legal text has,
and what authority it is subject to.8 Ignoring legal context
leads legal corpus linguistics to obscure the decisions a legal
interpreter must make. Should a precedent control a subsequent situation? How should a legal term relate to its statutory
definition? These are the kinds of questions judges face, but
legal corpus linguistics sidesteps. Instead, legal corpus analysts often treat the normative judgments that courts must
make as though they were resolvable through empirical
inquiry.9
Legal corpus linguistics similarly tends to ignore the institutional context that brings social groups and linguistic patterns into relations of power and practical purpose.10 Laws are
produced by large groups of people acting under particular
rules and authorities. They constrain and empower people in
different positions, often positions within the government itself.
6

See infra Part I.
Attending to frequency is not in itself a problem: “virtually every corpusbased paper reports how often a linguistic phenomenon occurred or how often it
co-occurred with some other linguistic phenomenon or extralinguistic variable.”
Stefan Th. Gries, Dispersions and Adjusted Frequencies in Corpora: Further Explorations, in 71 LANGUAGE AND COMPUTERS 197, 197 (2010). But, as I discuss below,
frequency alone does not decide most legal questions, see infra Parts II and III, or
even most linguistic ones, see infra subpart I.A.
8
See infra Part II.
9
In this sense, much legal corpus linguistics echoes what Bernard Harcourt
has identified as the “systems fallacy” in “systems-analytic” inquiry, in which
“methods are portrayed as scientific, objective, and neutral tools, when in fact
they necessarily entail normative choices about political values at every key step.”
Bernard E. Harcourt, The Systems Fallacy: A Genealogy and Critique of Public
Policy and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 421–22 (2018).
10
See infra Part III.
7
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And they have an unmistakably weird genre. Legal corpus
work, however, treats law as a command from an unidentifiable
author to an unspecified audience of unrelated speakers. It
pretends that audiences do not distinguish between reading a
newspaper and reading a statute. And it is indifferent to those
who produce legal texts, looking instead to other guides—TV
personalities, newspaper editors, academic authors—without
justifying the choice. Which speakers and which genres should
guide our understanding of the law? These are normative
questions that implicate fundamental values of democratic legitimacy, not something that can be solved with a word search.
In short, corpus linguistics in linguistics rests on empirical
claims: that the corpus it studies and the patterns it uncovers
represent the language it analyzes. Legal corpus linguistics
uses empirical methods, too. But the relevance of those methods rests on normative claims: that the corpus it studies represents the language that should guide our understanding of the
law, and that the patterns it uncovers should influence our
interpretation of legal texts. Rather than trying to persuade us
to accept its normative claims, though, much legal corpus work
proceeds as though it held empirically verifiable answers.
Despite these failings, legal corpus linguistics could be of
use in legal reasoning.11 It could help specify the peculiarities
of legal language, help make it more comprehensible, revise
canons of legal interpretation, and incorporate underrepresented and underprivileged speakers into understandings
of the law. It could also help us get more realistic about the role
of ordinary language in legal interpretation and the realities of
legal notice. But it can make these contributions only if practitioners embrace the other half of an empirical attitude.
I
CORPUS LINGUISTICS IN LINGUISTICS AND IN LAW
Assertions about ordinary language routinely justify legal
interpretations and are central to interpretive theory.12 Yet for
11

See infra Part IV.
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 3 at 792 (“[T]he threshold question for the
‘standard picture’ of legal interpretation . . . starts with a search for the ‘ordinary
communicative content’ of the words of the law.” (quoting William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1086 (2017))).
Lawrence Solan has distinguished two valences of ordinary meaning: a range
acceptable or understandable to members of speech community, on the one hand,
and the single most prevalent or prototypical usage, on the other. Lawrence M.
Solan, Corpus Linguistics as a Method of Legal Interpretation: Some Progress,
Some Questions, 33 INT’L J. FOR SEMIOTICS L. 283, 288 (2020). Solan finds that
12

R
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the most part, legal interpreters adverting to ordinary meaning
rely on their own linguistic intuitions, on dictionaries produced
in often opaque ways by a small group of lexicographers, or on
a narrow field of preferred publications.13 Recently, a wave of
judges and commentators have proposed using corpus linguistics to address the problem of ordinary meaning.14
A. Corpus Linguistics in Linguistics
Linguistics, like any social science, is a broad field.15 As a
rough categorization, though, one can distinguish between two
overarching schools of thought. A “formal” or “generative” approach associated with the work of Noam Chomsky searches
for innate human characteristics that give rise to universal
language structures describable through fairly precise, static
rules.16 A “functional” approach, built on a more eclectic range
of sources, focuses on actual language use in various contexts.17 Functional linguists aim to describe the patterns (and
inconsistencies) in language-use data.18 They tend to approach language less as an innate, universal human characteristic and more as a factor in larger cultural complexes through
which meanings of all sorts are produced.19
nineteenth-century Supreme Court opinions displayed a more “casual understanding of what is ordinary” than many opinions do today. Id. at 286.
13
Anya Bernstein, Democratizing Interpretation, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 435,
443–70 (2018).
14
See sources cited in supra note 3.
15
I am particularly indebted to Stefan Th. Gries for comments on this introduction to corpus linguistics.
16
See, e.g., Charles Yang, Stephen Crain, Robert C. Berwick, Noam Chomsky
& Johan J. Bolhuis, The Growth of Language: Universal Grammar, Experience,
and Principles of Computation, 81 NEUROSCIENCE & BEHAV. REVS. 103, 104 (2017)
(“Universal Grammar: The initial state of language development is determined by
our genetic endowment, which appears to be nearly uniform for the species.”).
17
See, e.g., Johanna Nichols, Functional Theories of Grammar, 13 ANN. REV.
ANTHROPOLOGY 97, 97 (1984) (“Functional grammar . . . analyzes grammatical
structure, . . . but it also analyzes the entire communicative situation: the purpose of the speech event, its participants, its discourse context.”).
18
See, e.g., Roger Fowler, On Critical Linguistics, in Texts and Practices: READINGS IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 3, 3 (Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard & Malcolm Coulthard eds., 1996) (“‘Functional linguistics’ is ‘functional’ in two senses:
it is based on the premiss [sic] that the form of language responds to the functions
of language use; and it assumes that linguistics, as well as language, has different
functions, different jobs to do, so the form of linguistics responds to the functions
of linguistics.”).
19
Again, very broadly, formal linguistics tends toward the deductive or
model-driven form of social science inquiry, while functional linguistics tends
toward the inductive or grounded-theory form. See Nichols, supra note 17, at 97
(“Functional grammar, then, differs from formal . . . grammar in that it purports
not to model but to explain; and the explanation is grounded in the communicative situation.”). In the terms used by Ferdinand de Saussure’s influential struc-

R

R
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Like other functional linguists, corpus linguists derive language patterns not from overarching rules but from instances
of actual language use. They analyze compilations of language
use for pervasive patterns. Their data sets are the corpora they
put together: collections, sometimes but not always quite large,
of instances of language use relevant to their inquiry. For example, researchers might use academic journal databases to
find patterns in academic language;20 or recordings of everyday
conversations or narratives to find patterns in those;21 or twittural theory of language, formal linguistics looks for “a relatively stable linguistic
form (langue) being displayed in utterances (parole).” Alejandro I. Paz, Stranger
Sociality in the Home: Israeli Hebrew as Register in Latino Domestic Interaction, in
REGISTERS OF COMMUNICATION 150, 150 (Asif Agha & Frog eds., 2015). Functional
linguistics is quite variegated and itself has had different approaches, especially
across the several disciplines where it has taken root. See Nichols, supra note 17,
at 98 (noting “the bewildering variety of senses the[ ] terms [function and functional] have in the literature”). But in general, it emphasizes the social, communicative aspects of language—studying for instance the communicative effects of
grammatical forms or the ways speech patterns in practice give rise to relatively
stable linguistic forms, such as registers, over time. See Paz, supra note 19, at
150 (“[W]e can speak of enregisterment and trajectories of change across landscapes of sociolinguistic variation. Registers are not simply special linguistic
forms . . . but . . . aspects of social history . . . .”). In this sense, where formal
linguistics is more apt to abstract away from language use variation across a
population by treating it as random or marginal surface variation, functional
linguistics is more apt to see non-standard usages as representing some subset
that is itself patterned—not more nor less socio-historically contingent than a
standardized variant. See Susan Gal, Visions and Revisions of Minority Languages: Standardization and Its Dilemmas, in STANDARDIZING MINORITY LANGUAGES:
COMPETING IDEOLOGIES OF AUTHORITY AND AUTHENTICITY IN THE GLOBAL PERIPHERY 222,
222–23 (Pia Lane, James Costa & Haley De Korne eds., 2018) (“[T]he legitimacy
accorded ‘standard languages’ derives . . . from social institutions that valorize
one variety as the standard and install it as a hegemonic and supposedly fixed
norm . . . . It is hardly surprising that commonsense understandings even in the
scholarly world assume standardized languages to be simply the ordinary state of
‘the language.’ Yet, if standardization is but one sociolinguistic regime . . . then it
is useful to compare it with other forms of differentiation . . . [.]”). When functional
linguists look for cross-linguistic universals, they tend to ascribe such patterns
not to innate structures or classifications, but to shared socio-cultural communicative goals or effects like managing information flow, maintaining conversational
focus, and so on. See, e.g., John W. Du Bois, The Discourse Basis of Ergativity, 63
LANGUAGE 805, 806 (1987) (noting that “ [o]nly by looking outside the domain of
grammar, as it is usually envisioned, is it possible to recognize the actual basis for
the existence of . . . fundamental grammatical type[s]” that characterize different
types of languages); id. at 852 (“I suggest a view of divergent grammars as arising
out of the complex patterns of crosscutting currents which are immediately and
concretely co-present in the actual stream of discourse.”).
20
Douglas Biber, A Corpus-Driven Approach to Formulaic Language in English: Multi-Word Patterns in Speech and Writing, 14 INT’L J. CORPUS LINGUISTICS
275, 285 (2009).
21
See Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English , DEP’T OF LINGUISTICS: U.C. SANTA BARBARA, http://www.linguistics.ucsb.edu/research/santa-barbara-corpus[https://perma.cc/4QYW-AWTW] [hereinafter SBCSA] (last visited
Nov. 23, 2020). See generally THE PEAR STORIES: COGNITIVE, CULTURAL, AND LINGUIS-

R
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ter posts to determine how African American English dialect
traits manifest there.22 Compiling or choosing a corpus thus
involves methodological decisions of its own.23
Corpus data can be marked for various attributes: parts of
speech; demographic characteristics; languages used; communicative settings; and so on. Corpus linguists look for patterns
in these data to answer questions about how people use language in practice. Researchers often use mathematically complex tools to find these patterns, and much of corpus
linguistics sits at the intersection of linguistics and computer
science.24
Some concrete examples may help specify the wide range of
phenomena corpus linguistics can illuminate. Here’s one:
when speakers introduce new factors into conversation, they
generally do so in dribs and drabs rather than in big blocks.25
Across languages, speakers rarely introduce more than one
ASPECTS OF NARRATIVE PRODUCTION (Wallace L. Chafe ed., 1980) (using recordings of conversations that occurred in response to a film to study and compare
various languages).
22
Su Lin Blodgett, Johnny Tian-Zheng Wei & Brendan O’Connor, Twitter
Universal Dependency Parsing for African-American and Mainstream American
English, 56 PROC. ANN. MEETING ASS’N. FOR COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS, 1415, 1415
(2018).
23
Phillips & Egbert, supra note 3, at 1592–607 (discussing principles of
corpus design).
24
There are numerous ways to use corpora, not all of which require complex
computational tools. A firm grasp on the choices the method affords and the
rationales that argue for one tool over another requires some expertise in the
scholarship.
25
See Du Bois, supra note 19, at 817–24; Elise Kärkkäinen, Preferred Argument Structure and Subject Role in American English Conversational Discourse, 25
J. PRAGMATICS 675, 675–76 (1996). Linguists generally use the term “new information” to describe such a noun-phrase. I use the less technical terms “factor” or
“object” to avoid the implication that the pattern applies particularly to new facts
that a speaker wishes to convey. Rather, it applies to any conversational focus—
person, place, thing, experience, concept, etc. I emphasize this because philosophers of language occasionally claim that everyday conversation primarily involves the exchange of information in the sense of fact disclosure. Andrei
Marmor, Can the Law Imply More than it Says? On Some Pragmatic Aspects of
Strategic Speech, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 83 (Andrei
Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011). Linguistic scholars have concluded the
opposite: everyday conversation is full of strategy, play, aesthetics, affect-maintenance, and a range of other features that subsume its informational content.
ROMAN JAKOBSON, LANGUAGE IN LITERATURE 66–69 (Krystyna Pomorska & Stephen
Rudy eds., 1987) (describing the emotive, conative, poetic, metalingual, and
phatic functions of language); Michael Silverstein, The Improvisational Performance of Culture in Realtime Discursive Practice, in CREATIVITY IN PERFORMANCE 265,
282–95 (R. Keith Sawyer ed., 1997) (analyzing a naturally occurring conversation
involving the exchange of biographical information that turns out to involve a
wealth of socially strategic utterances drawing on shared understandings of belonging and status hierarchies).
TIC

R
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new factor in a single clause.26 New factors, moreover, tend to
get introduced as subjects of intransitive verbs or as objects of
transitive verbs, not as subjects of transitive verbs.27 That is,
in conversation, we typically introduce new characters first,
before describing them as acting on something else. This “Preferred Argument Structure”—a hypothesis still being developed
and refined decades after its introduction—suggests that people distribute, and perhaps process, new information in discrete chunks.
Another example: “speakers tend to re-use [linguistic]
structures they have recently comprehended or produced
themselves.”28 That is, I’m more likely to use a phrase or a
form if I just heard it in conversation, even if other options are
available; conversational participants thus engage in ongoing
mutual mimicry. This “structural priming” even occurs across
languages in bilingual conversations.29 Structural priming
shows that discourse participants are highly reactive to the
language use around them, often unwittingly structuring their
own contributions to echo those of their interlocutors.
Yet another: set phrases, or “lexical bundles,” allow speakers to quickly set the scene for further comment by “provid[ing]
interpretive frames for the developing discourse.”30 American
English conversation and academic writing both have lots of
lexical bundles, but each genre tends to deploy them differently. Conversationalists tend to use whole formulaic clauses
(utterances that include both a noun and a verb),31 preceded or
followed by conversation-specific information: “I don’t know
why X,” “what do you think about Y?”32 Academic writers, in
contrast, tend to prefer formulaic phrases, in particular noun
phrases, using them not as units but as surroundings into
which writers insert their own contents: “the end of the,” “the
26
See, e.g., Kärkkäinen, supra note 25, at 676 (collecting sources documenting Preferred Argument Structure in numerous languages).
27
Id.
28
Stefan Th. Gries & Gerrit Jan Kootstra, Structural Priming Within and
Across Languages: A Corpus-Based Perspective, 20 BILINGUALISM: LANGUAGE & COGNITION 235, 235 (2017). Structural priming was first described in a 1980 article
that “discussed repetitions of topical, inflectional, structural, or thematic material
in a conversation between burglars over walkie-talkies.” Id. at 238 (citing James
Schenkein, A Taxonomy for Repeating Action Sequences in Natural Conversation,
in 1 LANGUAGE PRODUCTION 21, 21–47 (B. Butterworth ed., 1980)).
29
Melinda Fricke & Gerrit Jan Kootstra, Primed Codeswitching in Spontaneous Bilingual Dialogue, 91 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 181, 181 (2016).
30
Biber, supra note 20, at 285.
31
Id. at 299 (“Conversation prefers fixed continuous sequences of words,
with a preceding or following variable slot.”).
32
Id. at 284.
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case of the,” “the fact of the,” and so on.33 Formulaic word
bundles thus follow genre-specific usage patterns.
A final example: in standard American English, speakers
may—but do not have to—use “that” to connect a clause like “I
think” or “he claims” and the content that follows.34 Both “I
think he likes ice cream” and “I think that he likes ice cream”
are grammatical, idiomatic utterances. It turns out, though,
that speakers tend to use this optional “that” when the material
that follows is syntactically complex, when its content is surprising or unexpected, and when speakers distance themselves
from it rather than committing to it.35 So, I am more likely to
say “I think he likes ice cream” if I am fairly sure he really does
like ice cream; and more likely to say “he thinks that I like ice
cream” if I do not, in fact, like ice cream. Known as “complementizer that,” this optional form thus relates language use to
surrounding linguistic structures, narrative content, and “semantic prosody”—that is, the linguistic expression of a
speaker’s attitude toward what is being said.36
As these examples demonstrate, corpus linguistics in linguistics is a sophisticated, complex, and evolving methodology.
It is also often tremendously exciting, producing findings that
reveal the hidden structures of our interactions. To pursue
their interests, corpus linguists look within their chosen corpora for “collocation,” or “the co-occurrence of words”; “colligation,” or “the co-occurrence of words with grammatical
choices”; “semantic preference,” or the “co-occurrence of words
with semantic choices”; “semantic prosody . . . [which] express[es] attitudinal and pragmatic meaning”;37 as well as relations between pragmatic context and language use.
Corpus linguists often consider how frequently a term (or
other linguistic phenomenon) appears, but the precise role of
frequency remains a matter of debate, not least because its
33

Id.
See Sandra A. Thompson & Anthony Mulac, The Discourse Conditions for
the Use of the Complementizer that in Conversational English, 15 J. PRAGMATICS
237, 249–50 (1991); see also T. Florian Jaeger, Redundancy and Reduction:
Speakers Manage Syntactic Information Density, 61 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 23, 48–50
(2010) (arguing that this pattern distributes information within discourse).
35
Stefanie Wulff, Stefan Th. Gries & Nicholas Lester, Optional that in Complementation by German and Spanish Learners, in WHAT IS APPLIED COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS? ANSWERS FROM CURRENT SLA RESEARCH 99, 99–100 (Andrea Tyler, Lihong
Huang, & Hana Jan eds., 2018) (noting that complementizer “that” has been
“intensively studied . . . [o]ver the last 25 years”).
36
JOHN SINCLAIR, TRUST THE TEXT: LANGUAGE, CORPUS AND DISCOURSE 174 (John
Sinclair & Ronald Carter eds., 2004) (defining “semantic prosody” as the aspect of
an utterance that “express[es] attitudinal and pragmatic meaning”).
37
Id.
34
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implications are often unclear.38 Say we want to determine
whether the “discharge” of a firearm usually means the shot of
just one bullet, or of any number of bullets shot at more or less
the same time.39 If our corpus shows that the word “discharge”
in the context of firearms most frequently indicates an individual bullet, that might imply that “discharge” ordinarily means
the shot of just one bullet. But it might instead suggest that
gun shooters usually fire a single shot rather than many at the
same time. So when people talk about discharging a gun, the
real-world event they refer to is most frequently a single-shot
event. Or alternatively, it might show that, irrespective of realworld event frequency, when people discuss gun shootings,
they tend to focus on the firing of a single shot. All of these are
possible explanations for the frequency with which the term
appears in the corpus: finding a frequency does not explain
why a term appears with that frequency. But the reason matters—especially if the inquiry helps us decide whether someone
who shot a bunch of bullets all at once is guilty of a bunch of
crimes, or just one.40
Similarly, an infrequent appearance does not negate a
word’s meaning or show that the word does not belong to a
particular meaning category.41 As Tammy Gales and Lawrence
Solan have pointed out, the term “blue pitta,” which is the
name of “a bird of Asia,” may not appear at all in a corpus of
American usage, but that does not make it “any less a bird.”42
38
Biber, supra note 20, at 280 (“The role of frequency and quantitative analysis in corpus-driven research is . . . controversial.”); see also Ethan J. Herenstein,
The Faulty Frequency Hypothesis: Difficulties in Operationalizing Ordinary Meaning Through Corpus Linguistics, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 112, 114 (2017) (arguing
that the frequency with which a word is used may be more indicative of the
underlying concept the term is signifying, rather than the “ordinary meaning” of
the word itself).
39
See State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1271 (Utah 2015) (Lee, Assoc. C.J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (using legal corpus inquiry to
interpret whether a statutory restriction on the “discharge [of] a firearm” allowed
prosecutors to charge a defendant who had shot several bullets in short succession to prosecute each bullet shot as a separate “discharge,” or whether the entire
volley constituted one “discharge”); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-508 (West
2007)).
40
See id.; see also Donald L. Drakeman, Is Corpus Linguistics Better than
Flipping a Coin?, 109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 81, 96 (2020) (“[C]orpus linguistics-based
originalism needs an argument supporting the claim that constitutional meaning
should be equivalent to the most frequent use when there are clear examples of
other uses.”).
41
Tammy Gales & Lawrence M. Solan, Revisiting a Classic Problem in Statutory Interpretation: Is a Minister a Laborer?, 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 491, 500 (2020).
42
Id. Overarching language patterns like prototypicality, type-token encompassment, markedness, and so on may explain the absence of a usage in a corpus
better than concluding that some term cannot have a particular meaning—just as
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Inversely, a word may be used frequently precisely because the
phenomenon it refers to is infrequent, and therefore particularly notable.43 If light switches tend to appear in a corpus as
failing to turn lights on, it may be that “light switch” generally
refers to a device that fails to turn a light on, or that light
switches in practice generally fail to turn lights on. But it may
instead be that light switches generally do turn lights on, so
much so that speakers expect them to and are more likely to
talk about light switches when they fail to work.
The basic sociological tendency that unexpected or noteworthy phenomena generate commentary is captured in the
concept of markedness.44 Markedness theory posits that
groups of terms often exist along a hierarchy of specificity. An
unmarked term expresses a general, frequent, or unremarkable
thing, while a marked one indicates something more specific,
infrequent, or noticeable.45 “Hat,” a general term, is less
a blue pitta is still a token of the bird type even if no one in an American language
corpus talks about it. As Solan notes, linguists are developing methods to differentiate meaningful from meaningless absences. Solan, supra note 12 at 290.
“When approached with the right methodological tools, corpora do provide . . . evidence that allows us, in principle, to distinguish between constructions that did not occur but could have”—”accidentally absent” terms like blue
pitta—”and constructions that did not occur and could not have”—those “‘significantly absent’ structures” that indicate a grammatically or idiomatically impermissible or incomprehensible usage. Anatol Stefanowitsch, Note, Negative
Evidence and the Raw Frequency Fallacy, 2 CORPUS LINGUISTICS & LINGUISTICS THEORY 61, 62 (2006) (citations omitted). Yet even such methods, which require
sophistication in both computational and linguistic theory, do not reveal why a
particular attribution is absent from a corpus. Id. at 68 (highlighting that the
complex computational approaches discussed can “only tell us that a particular
structure is significantly absent” but “do not . . . tell us why it is significantly
absent”); see id. at 73 (noting that, in evaluating the significance of absent or rare
attributions, “the data must be viewed in light of one’s theory of language”).
Funnily enough, now that Gales and Solan have coined the “blue pitta problem,”
we can reasonably expect blue pittas to start appearing in some corpora of American usage.
43
See Herenstein, supra note 38, at 114.
44
See Elizabeth Hume, Markedness, in 1 THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO PHONOLOGY 1, 2 (Marc van Oostendorp, Colin J. Ewen, Elizabeth Hume and Keren Rice
eds., 2011)(“[D]escribing an observation as unmarked is often taken to mean that
it is . . . more frequent, natural, simple, or predictable than the marked observation of the comparison set. The unmarked is often also referred to as the default
member of a class; that is, it is the member to be assumed, the most basic
member of the set, barring further requirements or information.”).
45
See, e.g., EDWIN L. BATTISTELLA, MARKEDNESS: THE EVALUATIVE SUPERSTRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE 1 (1990) (noting that markedness is a way of talking about “an
implicit hierarchization of polar terms such that one term of an opposition is
simpler and more general than its opposite,” and that “the terms marked and
unmarked refer to the evaluation of the poles; the simpler, more general pole is the
unmarked term of the opposition while the more complex and focused pole is the
marked term”).
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marked than “red hat,” in which the general term is modified by
the specifying adjective “red,” and also less marked than “beret,” which is a species of the genus hat that gets its own term.
Is “red hat” more or less marked than “beret”? It probably
depends on where you look and whether berets are in fashion.
“He,” formerly the unmarked pronoun in American academic
writing, was once used to describe a generic person, while
“she,” a marked term, referred to the subset of people who were
specifically female, when that attribute mattered to the
writer.46 Times have changed, and this pronominal markedness hierarchy is no longer so universal. The relevance of frequency, in short, will often depend on markedness, and
markedness is a sociological, as much as a linguistic,
phenomenon.
Likewise, linguists have noted that not all frequencies reveal the same things.47 The word “dog” will frequently appear
with the article “the” in a corpus of standard American English,
but that does not really tell us much about dogs; it mostly just
tells us how English treats nouns. Now say we search a corpus
of naturally occurring conversations for collocates (words that
appear alongside) of “dog.” We may find “dog” frequently cooccurs with “her.”48 The frequent appearance of the phrase
“her dog” tells us that a dog is something that can be possessed
by an individual. Many things can be possessed by individuals, though, so although a high proportion of “dog” uses may go
along with the word “her,” a relatively low proportion of “her”
uses will end up going along with the word “dog.” These words
do not give much “Mutual Information”: they do not strongly
implicate one another.49
When words do implicate one another, moreover, their “associations are not necessarily reciprocal in strength.”50 “Stray”
46
Markedness is an idea used in many areas of linguistic study as well as in
the social sciences, so the types of things that can be described as marked or
unmarked vary—from lexical terms to syntactic choices to socially significant
attributes and more. It is a way of recognizing both linguistic features and the
sociological presumptions—and inequalities—that go along with them.
47
Biber, supra note 20, at 286 (noting that “researchers on collocation have
observed that absolute frequency often fails to capture the word associations that
are most important for lexical research” (citations omitted)).
48
The “dog” example in this paragraph is taken from the evidence in Biber,
supra note 20, at 287.
49
Id. at 287–90 (discussing Mutual Information (MI) scores).
50
Nick C. Ellis & Fernando Ferreira-Junior, Constructions and Their Acquisition: Islands and the Distinctiveness of their Occupancy, 7 ANN. REV. COGNITIVE
LINGUISTICS 187, 198 (2009); Stefan Th. Gries, 50-Something Years of Work on
Collocations: What Is or Should Be Next, 18 INT’L J. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 137, 141
(2013) (“[B]idirectional/symmetric association measures conflate two probabili-
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is much more likely to be associated with “dog” than “dog” is
likely to be associated with “stray.”51 While a “stray” thing in a
corpus may likely be a dog, a “dog” in a corpus might be modified in many ways—good, big, old, her—before it is modified as
stray. This kind of “asymmetric” relationship requires “directional measures” that find not just where terms go together but
where one term predicts the presence of the other.52 For instance, the term “vehicle” may only rarely occur in situations
implicating airplanes. But if “airplane” usually occurs in situations implicating vehicles, that may indicate that ordinary language nonetheless classifies an airplane as a kind of vehicle.53
The categorical relations that terms have matter, too. It
may not suffice to look for co-occurrences of “airplane” and
“vehicle,” because tokens do not always go along with mentions
of their type. While most would agree that a car is a vehicle,
speakers may not usually specify that fact because it is presumed.54 Checking whether “airplane” regularly appears
alongside “vehicle” in a corpus, therefore, would not necessarily tell us whether an airplane is considered a token of the
vehicle type.55 This is because meaning does not just arise
from words that are co-present; it also depends on words that
are absent.56
The importance of co-presence and absence to meaning are
captured in the linguistic concepts of syntagm and paradigm.57
In the utterance “I like ice cream,” the words I, like, and ice
cream are in a syntagmatic relationship to one another: they
follow one another, and their connections give some meaning to
the sentence. Because of English word-order rules, for inties that are in fact very different: p(word1—word2) is not the same as p(word2—
word1), just compare p(of—in spite) to p(in spite—of).”).
51
Biber, supra note 20, at 287 (noting that “the combination stray dog is less
frequent, but dog is one of the few nouns that stray co-occurs with”).
52
Gries, supra note 50, at 146.
53
See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26–27 (1931) (holding that
“vehicle” does not encompass airplanes for the purposes of the National Motor
Vehicle Theft Act).
54
Gries, supra note 50, at 159.
55
See McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 26–27.
56
Solan, supra note 12 at 290 (noting that “[t]he absence of an entry in a
corpus achieves significance from the fact that the missing concept is expressed
in other language”).
57
See, e.g., RICHARD HARLAND, BEYOND SUPERSTRUCTURALISM: THE SYNTAGMATIC
SIDE OF LANGUAGE 3–4 (1993) (“One of the founding distinctions in Saussurean
linguistics is the distinction between ‘syntagmatic’ relations and ‘paradigmatic’
relations. . . . Paradigmatic relations are the relations holding between one word
actually selected for utterance and all the other words which could have been
selected but were not. . . . Syntagmatic relations are the relations holding across
the horizontal sequence of words uttered one after another.”).
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stance, a reader knows that “ice cream” is the object of the
transitive verb just from seeing that it follows “like.” There are,
however, also many other words that could have taken each
word’s place. “I” could have been “she,” “they,” “Isaiah” and so
on—though not, typically, “you.” “Like” could have been “dislike,” “love,” maybe even “make” or “steal.” These absent options stand in a paradigmatic relationship to the ones that were
chosen. Unused paradigm members are in a sense spectrally
present in the utterance, giving each word meaning through
implicit contrast. My addressee understands that I enjoy ice
cream, but am not necessarily crazy about it, in part because
my addressee knows that “love” was an unused option in the
paradigm set with “like.”
“[C]orpus linguistics . . . work[s] on the assumption that
meaning is created on both [syntagmatic and paradigmatic]
axes . . . . There is no reason why one should have a priority in
meaning potential over the other.”58 Collocational frequency
alone does not capture paradigm set choices. To get at paradigms, corpus linguists must go farther, for instance by mapping out collocations of collocations or assessing large
numbers of similarly structured utterances with different
meanings.59 This is one reason that “[f]requency of occurrence,
in the sense of pure repetition frequency, explains only a modest proportion of lexical variability.”60
Things get even more complicated when we look beyond
two-word collocations to multi-word phrases. The ordinary
meaning of “carry a firearm,” for instance, may turn less on the
typical usage of “carry” and more on the typical usage of the
entire phrase.61 “Carry a firearm” may function as a “lexical
bundle”—a group of words that gets deployed as a unit rather
than as individual words whose meanings are added together—
just like the slang phrase “packing heat,” which would be hard
58

Sinclair, supra note 36, at 170.
Vaclav Brezina, Tony McEnery & Stephen Wattam, Collocations in Context:
A New Perspective on Collocation Networks, 20 INT’L J. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 139, 141
(2015) (arguing that “collocates should not be considered in isolation but rather
as part of larger collocation networks” and introducing software that can display
such networks graphically); STEVEN BIRD, EWAN KLEIN & EDWARD LOPER, NATURAL
LANGUAGE PROCESSING WITH PYTHON 221-60 (2009).
60
R. Harald Baayen, Demythologizing the Word Frequency Effect: A Discriminative Learning Perspective, 5 MENTAL LEXICON 436, 456 (2010).
61
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127–32 (1998), superseded by
statute, Canadian River Project Prepayment Act, Pub. L. No. 105-316, 112 Stat.
3469 (1998), as recognized in Rodrigues v. County of Hawaii, CV 18-00027 ACKWRP, 2019 WL 7340497 (D. Haw. Dec. 30, 2019) (discussing the meaning of
“carry” in order to interpret the statutory phrase “carry a firearm”).
59
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to explain by evaluating collocates of the word “pack.”62 The
presence of words together can change each word’s individual
meaning into a joint meaning conveyed by the whole phrase.
Corpus linguistics, in sum, is a powerful methodology that
can illuminate hidden but pervasive patterns that structure
our language use in ways we do not articulate or even recognize. It reveals how discursive structures, linguistic genres,
and social contexts can constrain participants and organize
interactions without our conscious awareness—the working of
culture tractable on the page.63 At their most exciting, corpus
linguistics’ findings are surprising, yet relatable. That is because how we think we use language often does not quite reflect
what we actually do with it.
B. Corpus Linguistics in the Law
In the last few years, legal thinkers have become interested
in harnessing the analytic power of corpus linguistics for the
interpretation of laws. A number of influential publications,
conferences, and amicus briefs have pressed the method, and
growing numbers of judicial opinions have used it.64 This
makes sense: legal corpus linguistics promises to simplify and
resolve interpretive questions and offers legal writers a testable
empirical basis for assertions about linguistic realities.
Legal corpus linguistics, however, has largely differed from
corpus linguistics in the field of linguistics in ways that are
important but unrecognized in the field. Legal corpus analysis
has mostly looked for frequency and collocation data, not for
the kind of larger-scale patterning of linguistic interactions
that characterizes corpus linguistics’ most exciting findings.
For instance, drawing on the much-trodden case of Muscarello
v. United States, if we want to know whether a person who has
a gun locked in his glove compartment would normally be described as “‘carr[ying]’ a firearm,”65 we might look to see
62
Biber, supra note 20, at 275–76 (using “lexical bundle” to describe “multiword sequences that are idiomatic (e.g. expressions like in a nutshell)” and “sequences that are non-idiomatic but perceptually salient (e.g. you’re never going to
believe this)”); see also Anya Bernstein, Before Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
567, 581–84 (2017) (arguing that no legal rules determine whether judges treat
lexical bundles as phrases or as individual words).
63
Recognized, articulated discourse patterns, in contrast, can become available to be identified, and challenged, as forms of grammar, which “arise[s] from
patterns in the way language is used by speakers.” Thompson & Mulac, supra
note 34, at 250.
64
See sources cited in supra note 3.
65
See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 135 (1998), superseded by
statute, Canadian River Project Prepayment Act, Pub. L. No. 105-316, 112 Stat.
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whether the word “carry” usually appears with words having to
do with cars. If, in contrast, “carry” usually appears with
words having to do with individual humans, that might indicate that it is ordinarily used in the sense of to “carry [something] upon one’s person,”66 rather than to indicate
“conveyance,” for instance “in a vehicle.”67
Legal corpus inquiries have also used “key word in context”
(KWIC) searches to put a given term in a slightly longer utterance-level context, aiming to discern how often it is used in
some particular way as opposed to others.68 So, to figure out
whether the term “vehicle” normally encompasses airplanes,
we might search a corpus for all the utterances in which “vehicle” appears, then try to figure out how many of those can
reasonably be understood to encompass airplanes within their
scope, or search for “airplane” and see if “vehicle” is implicated.
Most legal corpus inquiries have used a few publicly available corpora. Particularly popular have been several large corpora compiled by the legal corpus linguistics project at
Brigham Young University, whose law school has been a leading force in promoting the method. These include the Corpus
of Contemporary American English (COCA) and the News on
the Web Corpus (NOW), as well as historical corpora like the
Corpus of Historical American English (COHA), and the Corpus
of Founding Era American English (COFEA). There are many
other corpora out there—linguists have collected all sorts of
texts and recordings to study—but the Brigham Young ones
are the legal corpus analysis favorites.
The COCA collects American materials, equally divided
among “spoken, fiction, popular magazines, newspapers, academic texts, . . . TV and Movies subtitles, blogs, and other
webpages.”69 The NOW corpus collects material “from webbased newspapers and magazines from 2010 to the present
time,” continuously crawling the English-language internet—
from Australia to Nigeria, Singapore to South Africa—for new
material.70 The COHA contains American texts from fiction
3469 (1998), as recognized in Rodrigues v. County of Hawaii, CV 18-00027 ACKWRP, 2019 WL 7340497 (D. Haw. Dec. 30, 2019).
66
See Mouritsen supra note 3, at 1926.
67
See Id. at 1915; Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 127–32.
68
See Mouritsen, supra note 3, at 1958.
69
The COCA is available at Corpus of Contemporary American English, ENGLISH C ORPORA , https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/ [https://perma.cc/
2UBG-UZY7] [hereinafter COCA] (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).
70
The NOW Corpus is available at NOW Corpus (News on the Web), ENGLISH
CORPORA, https://www.english-corpora.org/now/ [https://perma.cc/2LMMTADL] (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).
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and non-fiction books, magazines, and newspapers from the
1810s through the 2000s.71 And the COFEA has sources
“starting with the reign of King George III, and ending with the
death of George Washington (1760–1799),” including “documents from ordinary people of the day, the Founders, and legal
sources, including letters, diaries, newspapers, non-fiction
books, fiction, sermons, speeches, debates, legal cases, and
other legal materials,” including “the U.S. Statutes-at-Large
from the first five Congresses.”72
These corpora share an emphasis on size: each boasts of
the sheer number of words, often numbering in the billions,
that they collect. Yet they are sometimes a bit cavalier in their
claims about what those billions of words can reasonably be
seen to offer. The COFEA, for instance, tells us that it contains
“documents from ordinary people of the day” but does not give
the kinds of demographic information that would be crucial to
evaluating its range of representation of language in an era of
low literacy, expensive writing materials, and extreme opportunity disparity.73 Propertied White men and enslaved Black women were both ordinary people of the day subject to founding
era laws. But given their different access to text production
and preservation, the former is likely to be over-represented,
the latter under-represented, in a contemporaneous corpus.
This does not make the corpus useless; but it does mean that
“ordinary people of the day” fails to explain just what it is the
corpus offers.74
Relatedly, the COCA’s “spoken” genre texts come from national “TV and radio programs” such as “All Things Considered
(NPR), Newshour (PBS), Good Morning America (ABC),
[and]Oprah.”75 COCA’s documentation notes that these shows
71
The COHA is available at Corpus of Historical American English, ENGLISH
CORPORA, https://www.english-corpora.org/coha/ [https://perma.cc/6L52VMJ9] (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).
72
For the archives of legal corpora, see BYU LAW: LAW & CORPUS LINGUISTICS,
https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/ [https://perma.cc/B2GQ-TM95] (last visited
Oct. 26, 2020) (describing each of several corpora developed or under development by the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University).
73
See id.; Drakeman, supra note 40, at 84 (using the COFEA “requires
originalism theory to defend a particular definition of the ‘public’”).
74
See James W. Fox Jr., Counterpublic Originalism and the Exclusionary
Critique, 67 ALA. L. REV. 675, 679 (“[At the Founding,] there was no definitive
‘public,’ but instead a series of publics, some who were legally and socially privileged and dominant (white men in particular), and others who operated as dissenting communities that developed their own normative discourse and
challenged dominant views and interests (feminists, African-Americans).”).
75
See COCA, supra note 69 (quotation is located at the “PDF Overview” link).
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are “unscripted conversation[s].”76 Note, though, how such
sources differ from ordinary, naturally occurring interactions.
Professionally planned, edited, and broadcast performances involve media hosts with guests invited to discuss particular topics for particular purposes, such as providing entertainment,
information, or opinion. They occur in a limited time frame—
often just a few minutes—and focus on a few specific, predetermined topics. Participants with limited frames of mutual
reference or shared personal experience perform their talk for a
national public. The pragmatics of these interactions—the circumstances in which they occur—thus differ significantly from
naturally occurring conversations. And pragmatics have long
been recognized to affect both the organization and the meanings of linguistic utterances.77
Legal theory already hosts one prominent approach that
vociferously rejects using pragmatics to evaluate meaning: textualism. And legal corpus linguistics may be especially attractive to those with a textualist bent, who often find meaning
clear from the text itself and believe interpretation should be
focused on abstracted, general understandings.78 In Justice
Scalia’s canonical phrasing, for textualists, legal “words mean
what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were
written.”79 And as John Manning wrote, “[t]extualists give primacy to . . . evidence about the way a reasonable person conversant with relevant social and linguistic practices would have
used the words” in a statute.80
76

See id.
See, e.g., Michael Silverstein, Cognitive Implications of a Referential Hierarchy, in SOCIAL AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACHES TO LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 125, 129–30
(Maya Hickmann ed., 1987) (arguing that reference and predication “is a special
case” of the “semiotic-functional” aspect of language use, which involves pragmatic situation of language use as “a form of social action, a meaning-dependent
and meaning-generating activity”).
78
See Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Corpus and the Critics, 88
U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 282–87 (2021) (justifying legal corpus linguistics as more
reliable than typical textualist sources like “linguistic intuition . . .dictionaries,
etymology, and canons of construction,” but failing to consider the value of
sources rejected by textualists, such as legislative records).
79
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 16 (2012). See generally Solan, supra note 1, at 2053 (explaining
that, for evidence about the meanings of unclear terms, textualists eschew pronouncements by those who wrote and voted on the terms and consider instead
what those terms mean to idiomatic speakers).
80
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 70, 91 (2006); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 79, at xxv (2012) (“[T]he significance of an expression depends
on how the interpretive community alive at the time of the text’s adoption understood those words.”).
77

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-6\CRN604.txt

1416

unknown

Seq: 20

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

26-OCT-21

9:27

[Vol. 106:1397

Textualism sometimes asks how a layperson with no legal
training would understand a statute,81 sometimes looks to legal professionals,82 and sometimes imagines members of Congress.83 Textualists might look to dictionary definitions,84
81
Justice Scalia’s dissent in King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015), uses the
lay speaker version of textualism. The Affordable Care Act mandated tax credits
for eligible purchasers on a health insurance marketplace or “Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act.” Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2018).
The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the statute made federal tax
credits available only to those who purchased health insurance on a state-run
Exchange or also to those who used a federally-run one. The majority opinion
treated the phrase “Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” as a lexical bundle referring to Exchanges as described in interacting provisions of the Act, which required states to
establish Exchanges but also provided that when a state failed to do so, the
federal government would establish the Exchange instead. See Bernstein, supra
note 62, at 578–81 (analyzing the structure of the opinions in King v. Burwell).
Justice Scalia’s dissent, in contrast, treated the phrase “established by the State”
as the thing that carried the provision’s meaning. 135 S.Ct. at 2496 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). And it treated that phrase as primarily addressed to, and interpretable by, lay audiences: “You would think,” he wrote of the 5 to 4 Supreme Court
decision, “the answer would be obvious.” Id.
82
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a
Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995), uses the legally-trained speaker version of textualism. There, the Court was asked whether an Endangered Species Act of 1973
provision that limited people’s right to “take” endangered wildlife also limited the
right to change its habitat in ways that would prevent successful breeding. 16
U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2018). The Act defined “take” as “to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct.” Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 691 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)). The
majority opinion focused on an agency’s interpretation of the word “harm” in the
statutory definition, drawing on sources that indicated a broad scope of meaning
in lay uses of that word and concluding that habitat modification could harm
endangered wildlife. Id. at 694–708. Justice Scalia’s dissent, focused on historical understandings of “take” among legal professionals, explained that the term
“take . . . [was] as old as the law itself.” Id. at 717 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Those
familiar with the common law would recognize it as historically including only
purposeful pursuit or destruction of an animal, even if the uninitiated might not
know that meaning.
83
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991), uses the
legislative speaker version of textualism. The Voting Rights Act (VRA) prohibits
systems that give some “class of citizens . . . less opportunity than other members
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives
of their choice.” Id. at 383 n. 2 (quoting Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2014))). Did that include
elected judges as well as legislators? The majority decided it did. Justice Scalia’s
dissent laid out the proper approach to interpretation: “We are to read the
words . . . as any ordinary Member of Congress would have read them.” Id. at 405
(Scalia, J., dissenting). In this view, the legislature is presented as a kind of
audience for its own writing. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir.
1989) (asserting that written that records of statutory enactment may illuminate
what legislators thought their words meant and what “rules of language they
used” when writing the statute).
84
Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1740 (2020).
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social conventions,85 or legal background.86 But each approach starts from the insistence that an authoritative interpretation of legal text ought to be based on how its audience
would understand it. At the same time, however, textualist
tenets severely limit the sources interpreters may use to determine how any audience might understand a text. Aside from
the legal text itself, the theory countenances few other forms of
evidence about meaning: canons of interpretation; common
law and other laws; dictionaries; and, occasionally, some other
publications such as newspapers or novels, generally chosen
ad hoc.87 But none of these indicates how statutory audiences—whoever they are—would read the law.88
Textualism thus mandates using audience understanding
to interpret legal text, but also prohibits adherents from figuring out what any particular audience would understand. Legal
corpus linguistics promises to give textualism the empirical
basis it lacks by providing information about how people use
the language in statutes and, by extension, how they understand it. As the following Parts explain, however, this empirical
grounding is largely illusory because its practitioners mostly
ignore the contexts that give legal language meaning.
II
LEGAL CONTEXTS
Legal corpus linguistics often ignores the crucial characteristics of the language it investigates. When using a corpus
linguistics methodology—or at least corpus linguistics
software—its half-empirical attitude can yield answers that
look clear and decisive. But too often, these results answer
questions that are incomplete, incoherent, or peripheral to the
decision at issue. One key thing legal corpus linguistic inquiry
tends to neglect is the legal context of legal language. Functional linguists attend to, and help us recognize, how context
constrains and shapes linguistic patterning. Legal corpus linguistics, in contrast, often treats language as an undifferentiated mass that can produce clear answers to discretionary
questions at the press of a button.
85

Id. at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1831–33 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also Tara Leigh Grove, The
Supreme Court, 2019 Term—Comment: Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265,
268 (2020) (describing Bostock as involving “competing strands of textualism”).
87
See Bernstein, supra note 13, at 466–72.
88
Id. (discussing the sources textualism allows and explaining why they cannot reveal the audience understanding textualism seeks).
86
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A. Precedent
A recent Supreme Court amicus brief exemplifies the way
legal corpus linguistic analysis often ignores its most relevant
legal context.89 The brief, submitted in Rimini Street v. Oracle,
made a standard legal argument about the applicability of precedent, but presented that argument as though it were an empirical claim about language.90 The brief’s discussion of
linguistics was never really made relevant to the legal issue,
but it still gave the brief’s conclusions a veneer of testable
correctness.91
The Copyright Act authorizes judges to “allow the recovery
of full costs” by litigants, and adds that “the court may also
award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part
of the costs.’”92 Rimini Street asked whether those costs included expert witness fees.93 Several years earlier, another
case had interpreted some similar terminology in the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), which allows
judges “to award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs”
to prevailing plaintiffs.94 The Court had held that the IDEA’s
grant of costs did not include expert witness fees. Instead, the
term “costs” in the IDEA was limited to the categories listed in
28 U.S.C. § 1920:95 “fees for the clerk and marshal; transcript
fees; disbursements for printing and witnesses; fees for making
copies; docketing fees; and the compensation of court-appointed experts and certain special interpretation services.”96
89
Brief for Scholars of Corpus Linguistics as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5–6, Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873 (2019) (No. 171625) [hereinafter Rimini Street Amicus Brief].
90
Id. at 30–37.
91
Id. at 19–30.
92
See Rimini Street, 139 S. Ct. at 877, 881. As the court below explained,
“Title 17 U.S.C. § 505 provides: ‘In any civil action under [the Copyright Act], the
court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party
other than the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided
by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing
party as part of the costs.’” Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 879 F.3d 948, 965
(9th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original).
93
See Rimini Street, 139 S. Ct. at 877–78.
94
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 293
(2006) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2018)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
95
Id. at 297–98.
96
Rimini Street Amicus Brief, supra note 89, at 3 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821,
1920 (2018); Arlington, 548 U.S. 291). Expert witness remuneration under
§ 1920, the Arlington Court further noted, was “strictly limited” to the terms of 28
U.S.C. § 1821, which provides for payments to witnesses generally. Arlington, 548
U.S. at 298.
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In Rimini Street, the court below had concluded that the
Copyright Act’s allowance of “full costs,” in contrast to the
IDEA’s mere “costs,” indicated that Congress wished judges to
go beyond the limits of § 1920 and “award the full panoply of
litigation expenses,” including expert witness fees.97 The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether its earlier holding on
the term “costs” in the IDEA should also apply to “full costs” in
the Copyright Act.98
Whether a precedent should control a similar but not identical subsequent situation is the kind of classically legal question that litters the floors of law school classrooms. But the
Rimini Street Amicus Brief rested its arguments on language
claims that begged it. Using corpus analysis, the brief claimed
that “full costs” cannot mean something separate from “costs”
because “an adjective’s meaning is generally derived from the
noun it modifies, not the other way around,”99 so “‘full’ can no
more alter the meaning of ‘costs’ than it can the meaning of
‘moon,’ ‘speed,’ ‘time,’ ‘parking lot,’ or ‘house.’”100
This linguistic claim leaves something to be desired. Time
is a many-splendored thing, explored by philosophers from St.
Augustine to Martin Heidegger.101 But “full time” does not typically mean time in all its fulness. It means forty hours a week.
Adding “full” does not modify some stable notion of “time.”
Instead, it specifies a relevant frame that indicates the scope of
meanings “time” can have.102 Because linguistic and other
contexts suggest frames for interpretation, an adjective can
indeed alter the meaning of the noun it modifies; adding the
adjective “full” can drag the noun “time” from the mysteries of
temporality to the nitty gritty of employment law.
Moving from word (“time”) to lexical bundle (“full time”)
specifies the notional realm in which a noun plays. The Rimini
Street Amicus Brief claimed that “corpus research shows that
the meaning of the word ‘full’ is always determined in reference
97
Rimini Street Amicus Brief, supra note 89, at 3 (citing Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp. v. Ent. Distrib., 429 F.3d 869, 885 (9th Cir. 2005)) (emphasis
added).
98
Id. at 7.
99
Id. at 1.
100
Id.
101
See William Alexander Hernandez, St. Augustine on Time, 6 INT’L J. HUMAN.
& SOC. SCI. 37, 37–40 (2016); HUBERT L. DREYFUS, BEING-IN-THE-WORLD: A COMMENTARY ON HEIDEGGER’S BEING AND TIME, DIVISION I 244 (1991).
102
Charles J. Fillmore & Collin Baker, A Frames Approach to Semantic Analysis, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 791, 791–92 (Bernd Heine & Heiko
Narrog eds., 2d Ed. 2015).
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to the word it is modifying.”103 But this is so only after we
decide on a frame: are we talking about “time,” the potential
expanse of temporality, or “full time,” the employment
category?
Through its linguistic claim, moreover, the Rimini Street
Amicus Brief set an empirical question—how does “full” modify
nouns?—in place of the legal question the Court faced—should
a precedent about the word “costs” in one statute control the
phrase “full costs” in another? This substitution undermines
the basic reason-giving responsibility that lies at the heart of a
court’s legitimation in our system. And the Court took the bait,
holding that “full” simply “means the complete measure of the
noun it modifies,” without acknowledging that its job was to
determine the proper frame within which to understand that
noun.104 The opinion even used (without attribution) the Amicus Brief’s example, noting that “[a] ‘full moon’ means the
moon, not Mars.”105
The distinction between the moon and Mars is hard to
dispute, yet also not entirely to the point. After all, if an astronaut says that she has been to “the moon,” she is likely to be
referring to the mass of rock and metal that forms the Earth’s
natural satellite. In contrast, when she points up at the sky
and says, “Look, a full moon,” she is likely not referring to that
mass of rock and metal in all its three-dimensional fullness—
the Earth’s natural satellite is, after all, full all the time.
Rather, “a full moon” is likely to indicate the glowing orb that
hangs in the sky at night, having waned and now waxed over
the course of a month. Neither the mass of rock and metal nor
the glowing orb is Mars. Yet putting “full” before “moon” can
indeed alter its meaning by changing the frame within which
we understand it.
Just so, the meaning of “full costs” depends on which notion of “costs” is in play. That determination is made by deciding on the applicability of precedent, with all the normative
considerations that entails. If we have already decided to understand “costs” in the 28 U.S.C. § 1920 sense, then it might
make sense to see how “full” interacts with nouns in such
(peculiar, unusual, extremely non-ordinary) frames. But if we
decide to understand “costs” as one part of the lexical bundle
“full costs,” then a corpus inquiry might instead check to see
how “full costs” is used in ordinary language. Not that this is a
103
104
105

Rimini Street Amicus Brief, supra note 89, at 21.
See Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2019).
Id. at 879.
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good way to resolve a legal question, but for the curious: the
COCA returns 79 instances of “full costs,” all of which have to
do with the panoply of actual costs incurred in some process,
and none of which could remotely be described as staying
within the kind of limits imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920.106
The conclusion amici pressed—that “full costs” was merely
a variety of “costs,” as hooked by precedent to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920—was a reasonable application of standard legal analogic reasoning. The Rimini Street Amicus Brief’s linguistic arguments, on the other hand, incorrectly focused on the word
“full” rather than the way frames and contexts guide meaningmaking. Worse, they did not help answer the question the
Court faced. In fact, they could be relevant only after the legal
question about precedent—the question the Court faced—was
already decided. Instead of addressing the question the Court
had to grapple with, the Rimini Street Amicus Brief substituted
a question that it could answer more easily, but that was less
relevant.107 In doing so, it presented its own decisions about
how to frame the text as though they were characteristics of the
text itself.
There was another aspect of legal context that the Rimini
Street Amicus Brief neglected. The brief used not only the
COCA and COHA, but also Supreme Court opinions contemporaneous with the Copyright Act’s enactment as a “proxy for
historic legalese.”108 But statutes differ from Supreme Court
opinions. Instead of a statute’s boxy Russian dolls of crossreferential provisions, judicial opinions feature narrative writing, frequent metaphors and abstractions, and occasional jabs
at grandiosity. Even stranger, the Amicus Brief also used
“publicly-available text on [one litigant’s] own website” and
“contracts to which [that litigant] was a party.”109 The brief
106
See COCA, supra note 69. A couple of examples: “Because of this highly
subsidized financing, the BPA’s power rates do not reflect the full costs incurred in
making the power available.” Kenneth W. Costello & David Haarmeyer, Reforming
the Bonneville Power Administration, 12 CATO J. 349, 352 (1992) (emphasis added). “In the Product Development Partnerships approach, R & D investments are
funded up-front through philanthropic and public financing, so companies do not
need to recoup the full costs of R&D afterwards through high medicine prices.”
Veronika J. Wirtz et al., Essential Medicines for Universal Health Coverage, 389
LANCET 403, 452 (2016) (emphasis added).
107
See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 97 (2011) (describing the
“substitution principle” in psychology, which posits that “[i]f a satisfactory answer
to a hard question is not found quickly, [individuals] will find a related question
that is easier and will answer it [instead],” without realizing that they are not
answering the original question).
108
Rimini Street Amicus Brief, supra note 89, at 17–18.
109
Id. at 18.
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does not explain, though, how a modern litigant’s use of a term
could demonstrate how a legislature or a broader public understood the term almost two centuries earlier. Thus, much of the
brief’s evidence had no clear relevance, even to the question it
itself posed.110
This amicus brief thus harnessed the corpus method’s air
of scientific certainty to analyze an issue peripheral to the
question the litigation raised using data of questionable relevance. In some ways, this was unavoidable. Whether precedent should apply in a similar but non-identical situation is not
a question susceptible to scientific inquiry. It must be resolved
by a decision not about how the law is, but about how it should
be. By treating that question as though it were a factual issue
resolvable by recourse to realities observed through social-scientific methodologies, the brief invited the Court to obscure its
legal judgment with a veneer of neutral objectivity.
Legal corpus approaches can be more modest and more
useful. For instance, an amicus brief using legal corpus linguistic inquiry, submitted by advocacy organizations in FCC v.
AT&T, avoids many of the problems discussed so far.111 In that
case, a trade organization had submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), seeking records having to do with an FCC
enforcement action against AT&T.112 AT&T argued that some
records were protected from release under FOIA’s exemption
7(C), which allows agencies to withhold “‘records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes’ that ‘could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.’”113 The question was whether a corporation
could have the kind of “personal privacy” interests FOIA protects. The court below had ruled that it could.114
The FCC Amicus Brief took aim at one particular argument
made by AT&T: that “the meaning of the word personal as . . .
110
In addition, the Rimini Street Amicus Brief claims to analyze ordinary
meaning surrounding the Copyright Act of 1831, Act of Feb. 3, 1831, § 12, 4 Stat.
438–439. Rimini Street Amicus Brief, supra note 89, at 17. But the provision at
issue is in a 1976 Copyright Act amendment. Copyright Act of 1976, § 505, 90
Stat. 2586. The brief never explains why it uses nineteenth century legal material
and twenty-first century private material to interpret a 1976 statutory provision.
111
Brief for the Project on Government Oversight, the Brechner Center for
Freedom of Information, and Tax Analysts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011) (No. 09-1279) [hereinafter FCC Amicus
Brief].
112
FCC, 562 U.S. at 399–401.
113
Id. at 401 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2018)).
114
Id.
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used in FOIA is governed by [FOIA’s] definition of the word
person,” because “personal is the ‘adjectival form’ of the noun
person and as a result, its meaning is necessarily affected by
the definition of person.”115 AT&T argued that, since FOIA’s
definition of person “includ[es] corporations,” releasing a record
could invade the corporation’s personal privacy.116
AT&T’s legal argument rested on a purported fact about
language patterning in English generally.117 The FCC Amicus
Brief contested the validity of that purported linguistic fact.
The brief notes that the adjective “personal” evolved separately
from the noun “person,”118 so defining “person” to include corporations has no linguistically necessary implications for the
adjective “personal,” just as a current definition of “act” does
not have necessary implications for the meaning of the adjective “actual,” to which it is related but not identical.119 The
brief argues that “[p]ersonal privacy is not a legal term of art,”
and should be interpreted as used in ordinary speech.120 It
then surveys a couple of large corpora and the Google search
engine, finding that both “personal” and “privacy” tend to be
used in the context of individual human beings, not
corporations.121
The FCC Amicus Brief uses a corpus to rebut a claim about
general, non-legal English language use. By specifying the
frame in which to view the target phrase, the brief makes common usage relevant. On its own terms, the brief’s turn to
corpus data made sense: it explained why common usage was
relevant and sought it in places it was likely to reside. In other
words, the brief gave reasons for finding its approach relevant
to the question it posed, and for finding the evidence it used
relevant to its pursuit of an answer.
Legal corpus linguistics can be useful as a limited check on
factual assertions about language practice. But it cannot resolve legal questions like whether a precedent defines a statutory term or whether a statutory term encompasses a
particular meaning. It is such legal questions, however, that
often determine what kind of usage—ordinary, precedential, or
something else—contributes to the meaning of a statutory
term. If anything, turning to an empirical method can distract
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

FCC Amicus Brief, supra note 111, at 3.
Id.
See id. at 3–4.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 11–25.
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legal interpreters from the inquiry they are charged with resolving. It introduces considerations that may be true, but
irrelevant.
B. Legal Texts
Corpus linguistics is of similarly little help in determining
what part of a legal text to focus on. Someone interpreting law
must first select an object of interpretation.122 This step is
often invisible because legal opinions and commentary tend to
proceed as though the object were obvious.123 Yet, as I have
argued elsewhere, there is usually—perhaps always—choice
involved.124 Judges can select a single term, or the phrase it
appears in; a series of words taken individually, or the lexical
bundle they make up together; a substantive statutory command, or the gloss the statute’s definition section gives it; or
even something outside the primary legal text altogether—a
concept or proposition related to, but not addressed in, the
governing statute.125 An empirical method like corpus linguistics cannot help judges make this crucial decision.126 Yet writers who use legal corpus linguistics sometimes act as though
the existence of the corpus could guide or justify this choice.
People v. Harris, a recent Michigan Supreme Court case,
illustrates how empirical methodology can perversely distract
legal interpreters from the very thing they interpret.127 In Harris, a Detroit resident filed a complaint with the police department alleging that an officer had assaulted him without
provocation while two fellow officers looked on.128 The department investigated but, on the basis of testimony from the of122
Bernstein, supra note 62, at 573 (“Text selection specifies the focal text
whose meaning is to be determined. It is . . . the condition of possibility for
interpretation.”).
123
See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from
Originalism: The Case of Executive Power, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (2018) (arguing
that “originalists [and textualists] theorize an ‘interpretation zone’ in which meaning is non-normative and self-evident,” yet assume that “(1) the originalist has
chosen the proper and only relevant text and has not added to the text by pragmatic inference; and (2) the text chosen—one or two words in some cases —
amounts to the proper unit of textual analysis”).
124
Bernstein, supra note 62, at 572–74.
125
Id. at 574–89 (giving examples and analysis of each kind of selection).
126
See, e.g., Brian G. Slocum & Stefan Th. Gries, Judging Corpus Linguistics,
94 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 13, 17 (2020) (“[E]ven determinants of ordinary
meaning that are based on systematicities of language usage typically require
courts to consider the context of the relevant statute.”)
127
885 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 2016).
128
Id. at 834.
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ficers, found no wrongdoing and closed the investigation.129
Over a year later, after a private investigator uncovered video
footage of the encounter, the department reopened its investigation.130 The officers were indicted for, inter alia, obstruction
of justice and giving false testimony during the investigation.131 The officers moved to dismiss, arguing that Michigan’s
Disclosures by Law Enforcement Officers Act (DLEOA) prohibited using their false testimony in a criminal charge against
them.132
The DLEOA provides: “An involuntary statement made by a
law enforcement officer . . . shall not be used against the law
enforcement officer in a criminal proceeding.”133 The statute
defines “involuntary statement” as “information provided by a
law enforcement officer, if compelled under threat of . . . any . . .
employment sanction.”134 When ordered to testify in the department’s investigation, the officers were informed that failure
to answer questions would subject them to departmental
charges and could lead to dismissal, so their participation at
least was compelled.135 But could it be used against them in a
criminal proceeding?
Harris gained some fame because both majority and dissent used legal corpus linguistic approaches, and some notoriety because they reached opposite conclusions based on the
same data.136 Searching the COCA for “information,” the ma129

Id.; id. at 860 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 860 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also id. at 835 (“A video recording of the incident surfaced after defendants had
made their statements.”).
131
Id. at 835.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 837 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.393 (2019)).
134
Id. (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.391(a) (2019)) (emphasis omitted).
135
Id. at 834 (quoting the police department’s “advice of rights form” provided
to the officers); id. at 837 (noting that the dispute between the prosecution and the
defendants was whether or not the act covered false or misleading information
and hence implying that both sides agreed that the statements were compelled).
But see id. at 855 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that “lies . . . are . . . not ‘compelled’”).
136
Carissa Byrne Hessick, More on Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 11, 2017, 1:01 PM), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2017/09/more-on-corpus-linguistics-and-the-criminal-law.html
[https://perma.cc/WFR2-Z6NR] (“The majority and the dissent [in Harris] come to
the precisely opposite conclusions about the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a statutory
term based on the same corpus data.”). The fact that people could reach different
conclusions based on the same data does not necessarily undermine the utility of
corpus linguistics. But it does cast doubt on the impression some proponents
give that the method yields ultimate or undisputable answers to legal questions.
See Drakeman, supra note 40, at 92 (“[T]he process of turning hits into quantifiable cases of one usage or another can potentially lead to different outcomes
130
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jority concluded that “[e]mpirical data . . . demonstrates . . .
[that i]n common usage, ‘information’ is regularly used in conjunction with adjectives suggesting it may be both true and
false,”137 which “strongly suggests that the unmodified word
‘information,’ [sic] can describe either true or false statements.”138 The DLOEA thus protected officers from criminal
consequences “for perjury, lying, providing misinformation, or
similar dishonesty” in an employment investigation.139
The dissent noted that “99.44% of the time ‘information’ in
the COCA is unmodified by any . . . adjectives related to veracity,” such as “accurate,” “inaccurate,” or “false.”140 And “where
‘information’ is unmodified by one of these adjectives,” the dissent went on, “I believe it is overwhelmingly used to refer to
truthful information.”141 The dissent thus charged that the
majority opinion ignores markedness. Markedness, recall,
posits that a term will appear in a prototypical form to indicate
more prototypical meanings, while modifiers or other indicators will signal less central or general meanings.142 So, the
dissent pointed out, “information” can be marked as “false” or
“inaccurate,” but is presumptively accurate if unmarked. It
would further be reasonable to interpret phrases like “truthful
information” or “accurate information” not as redundant, but
as emphatic.143
The majority also failed to recognize the way English pervasively distinguishes inaccuracy from falsehood. If I state that
Samuel likes ice cream, but unbeknownst to me he actually
does not, I have provided inaccurate information. But I have
not lied. On the other hand, if I know Samuel does not like ice
cream but claim he does anyway, I have not simply given inacbased on the subjective judgments of different researchers and their research
assistants about the meaning of the various hits.”)
137
Harris, 855 N.W.2d at 839.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 838.
140
Id. at 850 n.14 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141
Id. (giving examples such as Gretchen Morgenson, Outside Advice on
Boss’s Pay May Not Be So Independent, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2006) (“The company
operates Verizon’s employee benefits Web sites, where its workers get information
about their pay, health and retirement benefits, college savings plans and the
like.” (emphasis added)); Jenny Anderson, As Lenders, Hedge Funds Draw Insider
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2006) (“When a public company takes out a loan, it
generally agrees to provide the lender with certain information, sometimes including monthly financial updates.” (emphasis added)).
142
See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
143
See also Ethan J. Leib & James J. Brudney, The Belt-and-Suspenders
Canon, 105 IOWA L. REV. 735, 742 (2020) (positing that legislatures often use
redundancy and overlap in terminology for emphasis and to ensure full coverage,
rather than avoiding redundancy, as the rule against surplusage suggests).
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curate information. I have provided misinformation, false information, or, colloquially, a lie. If someone reports on my
statement, saying my claim provided “inaccurate information”
would mean something quite different than calling it “misinformation.” The speaker’s evaluation of my inner state is built
into the words—part of the semantic prosody so central to
meaning production. The Harris majority did not cite any instances in which the word “information,” unmarked as it is in
the statute, described intentional falsehoods.144
The majority in Harris thus used a half-empirical approach. It plugged its target word into the COCA interface and
noted that it got some results where the “information” was
something other than accurate and truthful. But it did not
incorporate other basic linguistic features like markedness, semantic prosody, and the linguistic marking of intentionality, all
of which contribute significantly to meaning-making.
Worse yet, COCA data distracted the majority from the
legal choices it had to make about the statute itself. Recall that
the DLOEA prohibits using an officer’s “involuntary statement”
in a criminal proceeding, and defines “involuntary statement”
to mean the “information provided by a law enforcement officer.”145 These officers stated that no assault occurred, and
they were required to provide some sort of statements by the
department investigation.146 But prosecutors did not use the
information they provided—the (purported) fact that no assault
occurred—in a criminal proceeding. Instead, they used the fact
that the officers had made this assertion, which was a lie.147
Compare the law of evidence, where words offered for “the truth
of the matter asserted in the statement” can constitute hearsay, while those same words offered to show the fact that the
words were uttered cannot.148
There is thus some tension between the statutory term
“involuntary statement” and the definition of that term as “in144
Cf. Harris, 499 Mich. at 839 (arguing that “‘information’ is often used to
describe false statements”); id. at 839 n.35 (citing uses of the phrases “false
information” and “misleading information” to describe untrue statements, but no
instances of unmarked “information” used for that purpose).
145
See id. at 837 (emphasis added).
146
See id. at 834.
147
See id. at 835 (noting that the officers were charged with obstruction of
justice as a result of the false statements); id. at 344 (holding that the officers’
statements were protected by the DLEOA).
148
See FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2), 801(c) advisory committee’s note to 1972
amendment (“If the significance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that
it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of anything asserted, and the
statement is not hearsay.”).
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formation provided.” Imagine, for example, an officer compelled
to testify in an internal investigation of a complaint alleging
that his conduct was racist. Say the officer, asked why he
approached the complainant, replied, “Black people don’t belong in that neighborhood.” If prosecutors subsequently wish
to use this testimony, would they be using the information that
the officer provided—the purported fact that Black people do
not belong in a particular neighborhood? Clearly not. What
would matter would be the fact that the officer made this racist
statement.
The textual question in Harris, then—if that’s what you
wanted to focus on—was not really whether “information” has
to be true. Rather, the court needed to decide whether the
statute’s definition of “statement” as “information” precluded
prosecution only on the basis of facts asserted in an officer’s
testimony, or also precluded prosecution on the basis of the
fact that the officer said something. That is, does the statute
protect only the “information provided” in its definitions section, or the “statement” in the operative provision as well? It
may be interesting to know how the terms “information” and
“statement” appear in newspapers and on TV. But that does
not illuminate how we ought to construct the relation between
the statutory term and its statutory definition.149 The majority’s use of corpus linguistics ignored not only the considerations a corpus analysis must take into account, but also the
very question the court faced. Instead it substituted a question
more amenable to empirical inquiry, but less relevant to the
legal conundrum.
Perhaps most perniciously, focusing attention on a single
word like “information” pulls attention away from the statute’s
role in government and society. This statute protects government employees who wield deadly force from legal consequences in certain situations. The litigation asked the court to
identify how far that protection extended. The fundamental
question Harris raises, after all, is not about the meaning of
“information.” It’s about the role of police, government, and the
rule of law in a democratic society. Because of the adversarial
system’s one-off structure, the court must answer that question within the confines of a dispute about whether a particular
149
How to relate a statutory definition to the term it defines presents an
ongoing difficulty for courts. See Bernstein, supra note 62, at 574–78 (discussing
how choosing between a statutory term and its statutory definition allowed majority and dissent to each justify their conclusions in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995)).
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statement may be used in a prosecution. But that does not
make the question of the law’s social effects any less important.
Legal corpus linguistics, with its obsessive focus on single
words used in unconnected situations, to the exclusion of
larger and more relevant contexts, encourages legal interpreters to neglect the real import of their decisions.
C. Conclusion
Legal corpus analysis risks presenting a result that appears clear but is actually irrelevant. One might think this
irrelevance would be easy to brush off—analytic chaff that a
court can easily throw out. But as Rimini Street’s use of the
Rimini Street Amicus Brief’s reasoning shows, that is not always so.150 With its technical, seemingly objective tools and its
clear, decisive answers, legal corpus linguistics can provide a
tempting certainty for judges in search of right answers and
non-discretionary decisions.151 This false certainty is made
possible by ignoring the legal context of the decision: that is,
the way that legal texts shape the meaning of a legal term and
channel its social effects. As any law student learns, such legal
processes leave judges with a lot of discretion. That discretion
cannot be delimited with an objective corpus of ordinary language. Rather, the judiciary bears the responsibility to exercise its discretion and to justify its decisions.
III
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS
The previous Part showed how legal corpus linguistics can
treat evidence not relevant to a legal determination as though it
were decisive. This approach conflates the availability of information with that information’s relevance to a particular conundrum. Relatedly, legal corpus linguistic proponents sometimes
ignore the institutional structures in which legal structures
function. Yet it is precisely such structures that give shape
and power to the law.
A. Audiences
Different laws address, and constrain, different groups of
people in different ways. This institutional context—which de150

See supra subpart II.A.
Legal corpus linguistics thus participates in a larger suite of opportunities
judges take to avoid the implications of the power they wield. See Bernstein,
supra note 13, at 442–501 for an extended discussion.
151
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termines not just a statute’s scope of power but also its interpretive pathways—often falls to the wayside in legal corpus
linguistic analysis. For example, a recent article promoting
legal corpus linguistics argues that legal interpreters should
conceive of industries as speaking their own specialized dialect,
and use their language patterns to interpret statutory terms
that affect them.152 The Article thus urges judges to devolve
interpretive authority onto private economic actors, because
industry members know best how specialized terms are used in
their particular fields. “[H]ow,” the article asks rhetorically, “is
a judge qualified to determine what the phrase tar sands
means within the petroleum industry?”153 Judges should use
corpora of industry-specific language to make such determinations, the Article argues, because we should “assume that the
law ought to reflect the common usage of those it attempts to
regulate.”154
The Article takes it as given that a statute that primarily
affects an industry also has that industry as its primary addressee. Yet even the Article’s own example belies this simple
view. In Shell Petroleum v. United States, a federal statute
stated: “There shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this chapter” a certain amount of money per barrel of
“[o]il produced from . . . tar sands.”155 Shell argued that “tar
sands,” in the oil industry, meant any material that required
something other than standard oil production methods.156 The
government argued that it encompassed only specific rock
types and especially high-tech extraction methods.157
Whom did the statute address and constrain? As part of
the Internal Revenue Code, it instructed a government agency,
the Internal Revenue Service, to “allow” a tax credit.158 Moreover, a ruling by the Federal Energy Agency, implementing a
related statute giving the executive authority to set oil prices,
had previously defined “tar sands.”159 The specialized audience the statute addressed was, in other words, primarily the
government itself. The petroleum industry stood to benefit, of
152

See Heilpern, supra note 3, at 379.
Id. at 381.
154
Id. at 394–97 (quoting Mouritsen, supra note 3, at 1956).
155
Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 182 F.3d 212, 215 n.5 (3d Cir. 1999)
(quoting 26 U.S.C. § 29 (2000) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 45K (2018))).
156
Id. at 214.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 215–16.
159
Id. at 214 (quoting Department of Energy Ruling 1976-4, 10 C.F.R. ch. II
Rulings 371, 372 (1980)).
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course, but it was not constrained, authorized, or otherwise
commanded by this provision.
One might argue that the court should nonetheless accept
the petroleum industry’s common usage, on the theory that
potential beneficiaries need notice to conform their conduct to
the law. Yet, in Shell Petroleum, the Federal Energy Agency had
interpreted “tar sands” years before Shell demanded its tax
credit.160 It is implausible that a major oil corporation would
be unaware of such a ruling. In other words, the question in
Shell Petroleum is not really whether “a judge [is] qualified to
determine what the phrase tar sands means within the petroleum industry,”161 but whether a judge should accept a definition produced by an expert administrative agency with
jurisdiction over the petroleum industry (and no direct financial stake in the outcome).162
Shell Petroleum illustrates a larger truth: laws often authorize and constrain government actors, not private parties.
Legal corpus linguistics proponents say they want to use “the
common usage of those [the law] attempts to regulate.”163
Many, if not most, statutes regulate not the conduct of people
outside the government but agencies inside it.164 For many
160
See id. at 214, 216 (showing that the Federal Energy Agency interpreted
“tar sands” in 1976 while Shell demanded its tax credit in 1983 and 1984).
161
See Heilpern, supra note 3, at 381.
162
Heilpern’s other example presents a different situation. In Weeks Tractor &
Supply Co. v. Arctic Cat Inc., the court interpreted a Louisiana statute governing
motor vehicle dealer contracts, which provided: “[i]n the event that a dealer ceases
to engage in the business of being a . . . dealer . . . the manufacturer or distributor . . . shall repurchase all new . . . vehicles of the current and immediate prior
model year.” 784 F. Supp. 2d 642, 644 (W.D. La. 2011) (quoting LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 32:1268.1 (2009) (repealed 2012)). Weeks asked about which specific
model year cars a manufacturer had to buy back from a dealer who closed the
business. This statute directly controlled the conduct of private parties—vehicle
manufacturers and sellers—rather than agencies, by providing a background
presumption in any contract between them. It would make sense, then, to ask
what “model year” meant for makers and sellers of vehicles, the parties whose
conduct the statute constrained. Weeks was a diversity case brought under Louisiana law, which provided that “[w]ords of art and technical terms must be given
their technical meaning when the law involves a technical matter,” id. at 647
(quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 11 (2019)) (alteration in original), and that
“[t]echnical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar
and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according
to such peculiar and appropriate meaning,” id. (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1:3
(2019)). See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750,
1825 (2010) (noting that legislatures have exerted much greater control over
statutory interpretation at the state than at the federal level).
163
Mouritsen, supra note 3, at 1956.
164
See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the
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statutes, then, a corpus representing those subject to statutory
commands would be centered on the language use of federal
bureaucrats. Yet legal corpus proponents have had little interest in the primary addressees of statutory language. Like John
Austin, this work tends to present law as “essentially the command of a sovereign to its subjects.”165
Statutes constrain and authorize in many ways. Different
statutes can have different audiences and addressees.166 A
statute can have a big effect on one group by constraining or
authorizing the action of another. And one statute can have
multiple audiences and addressees. Legal corpus proponents
may be attentive to the realities of how a particular term is used
in some contexts, but they tend to neglect the ways that legal
language comes to have its effects. This imbalance sometimes
yields an empirical analysis of how words work in a fictional
world—a world where federal statutes primarily command private parties rather than government agencies, and where statutory audiences are singular and clear. That is, legal corpus
proponents often treat language use as a free-floating, general
object of inquiry rather than the institutionally situated medium that linguistics recognizes it to be.
B. Speakers
Communication involves more than an audience: someone
must produce and utter the language that others perceive and
Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 910 (2013) (reporting on an empirical study
finding that legislative drafters considered agencies the primary statutory interpreters); Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A
Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501,
502–03 (2005) (stating that agencies are the primary statutory interpreters by
necessity); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions,
101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003) (arguing that interpretation debates could more
easily be solved by focusing on institutional interpretation); Peter L. Strauss,
When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency
Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 321
(1990) (stating that administrative agencies are primary statutory interpreters
because they need to pragmatically implement statutory regimes); Edward L.
Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369,
371–72 (1989) (characterizing legislation as directed to administrative agencies).
165
See Brian H. Bix, John Austin and Constructing Theories of Law, in THE
LEGACY OF JOHN AUSTIN’S JURISPRUDENCE 1, 1 (Michael Freeman & Patricia Mindus
eds., 2013).
166
Bernstein, supra note 13, at 459–61. See generally David S. Louk, The
Audiences of Statutes, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 137, 140 (2019) (discussing how
different audiences have different levels of legal fluency and different modes of
interacting with statutory schemes).
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interpret.167 A corpus collects speech by some speakers and
not others. Any corpus analysis thus makes a methodological
choice about which speakers to study. That methodological
choice in turn implies a claim about relevance: that these are
the right people to study for this analysis.
Language use patterns, moreover, are not spread evenly
across the population.168 They vary by educational background, region, national origin, ethnic context, class, and other
biographical specifics—factors which themselves tend to covary in particular ways.169 Using a corpus for legal interpretation, then, implies finding speakers who are relevant to determining the meaning of the law. That is, it implicitly claims that
taking those represented in the corpus as guides to the meaning of the law is democratically legitimate. Corpus linguistics
aspires to “maximize[ ] the chances of achieving a representative corpus,”170 one whose “sample includes the full range of
variability in a population.”171 But to do that, we must decide
which speakers count in giving meaning to law.
167
See ERVING GOFFMAN, FORMS OF TALK 144–45 (1981) (disaggregating the
notion of “speaker” into component functions: principal (the entity committed to or
bolstered by the meaning of the utterance), author (the entity choosing the form of
expression), and animator (the entity producing the utterance)). Goffman’s influential participant framework has been used and elaborated in subsequent research. For instance, linking Goffman’s participant framework with Mikhail
Bakhtin’s emphasis on intertextuality and heteroglossia, Judith Irvine has argued
that any communicative situation is “multiply dialogical,” involving dialogic relations that are crucially informed by other relations—shadow conversations that
surround the conversation at hand. Judith T. Irvine, Shadow Conversations: The
Indeterminacy of Participant Roles, in NATURAL HISTORIES OF DISCOURSE 131,
134–35, 151–52 (Michael Silverstein & Greg Urban eds., 1996). Irvine argues that
understanding the construction of the speaker role involves analyzing the “fragmentation process” through which participant roles—and the participants who
occupy them—are produced. Id. at 134.
168
Kathryn A. Woolard, Language Variation and Cultural Hegemony: Toward
an Integration of Sociolinguistic and Social Theory, 12 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 738, 738
(1985) (“The simplest and yet most important contribution of sociolinguistics to
social scientific knowledge is its insistence on recognizing the considerable variation in speech that exists within even the most homogeneous of societies.”); John
L.A. Huisman, Asifa Majid & Roeland van Hout, The Geographical Configuration of
a Language Area Influences Linguistic Diversity, 14 PLOS ONE 1, 1–2 (2019).
169
Penelope Eckert & William Labov, Phonetics, Phonology, and Social Meaning, 21 J. SOCIOLINGUISTICS 467, 471 (2017) (“[H]earers use phonetic cues to place
speakers in the social order, and . . . those perceived placements evoke a range of
social evaluations.”); Miyako Inoue, Gender, Language, and Modernity: Toward an
Effective History of Japanese Women’s Language, 29 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 392, 410
(2002). See generally WILLIAM LABOV, SOCIOLINGUISTIC PATTERNS (1972).
170
Phillips & Egbert, supra note 3, at 1593–94.
171
Id. at 1594 (quoting Douglas Biber, Representativeness in Corpus Design, 8
LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 243, 243 (1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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Academic corpus linguists study a corpus of language use
to draw conclusions about how people in that corpus use language. Legal corpus studies, in contrast, study a corpus of
language use to draw conclusions about linguistic meaning in
a quite different setting: the law. In fact, outside of constitutional interpretation, they generally eschew indications of how
people who produce legal language use it. So, for instance,
legal corpus analysts have not sought to study corpora representing the staffers and administrators who produce legislation;172 the members of Congress who discuss, authorize, and
enact it; the Presidential staff who advise the President on it; or
the President who signs or vetoes it.
A corpus of statute writer utterances would quite literally
“give[ ] voice to the will of . . . lawmakers,” something legal
corpus proponents value.173 Lawmakers are central characters in the life of statutes, which are unusually efficacious utterances, often creating or modifying obligations, rights, and
states of affairs.174 The “felicity conditions” that enable this
efficacy, moreover, depend on the social position of the speakers as government participants in a legally structured process.175 Moreover, in a rule-of-law democracy, the very
speakers who produce our laws are also governed by them.
Nonetheless, legal corpus analysts generally seek to shed light
172
Gluck & Bressman, supra note 164, at 910; Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe
R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 728–29
(2014); Jarrod Shobe, Agencies as Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role of
Agencies in the Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 518 (2017).
173
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 3, at 794-95 (proposing legal corpus linguistics as a way to constrain “the indeterminacy of the search for ordinary meaning”
and avoid taking such indeterminacy as “a broad license for ‘normative judgments,’” an attitude the authors argue “undermines reliance and fair-notice interests and gives voice to the will of judges, not lawmakers”).
174
Utterances that constitute the conditions they refer to are known as creative utterances. Michael Silverstein, Shifters, Linguistic Categories, and Cultural
Description, in MEANING IN ANTHROPOLOGY 11, 33–34 (Keith H. Basso & Henry A.
Selby eds., 1976) (distinguishing between utterances in which an “aspect of the
speech situation [is] presupposed by the sign token,” such that one cannot understand a word without some shared knowledge about its situation of use, and a
creative usage, which “make[s] explicit and overt the parameters of structure of
the ongoing events” and brings some aspect “into sharp cognitive relief”). The
most widely known kind of creative utterance is the performative or speech act.
See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 4–7 (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà
eds., 2d. ed. 1975); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE 16–19 (1969).
175
See AUSTIN, supra note 175, at 14 (explaining that, for a speech act to be
successful, “[t]here must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect”).
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on the language of law by analyzing corpora of speakers speaking in non-legal ways.
The absence of these key speakers from legal corpus studies is likely related to its close ties to textualism, which finds
using the language of Congress to interpret the statutes Congress produces illegitimate. Textualists generally prefer to look
to the understandings of the non-governmental speakers who
might read the statute,176 treating statutes as uncreated creators of social effects.177 Legal corpus inquiries, too, have focused on speakers generically, not on those who produced the
specific statute at issue.
Yet a commitment to interpreting legal text through the
language of the governed rather than the governing has implications that stand in tension with textualist tenets. For instance, textualists have traditionally held that “the metric [for
legal interpretation] is the understanding of a hypothetical reasonable person conversant with applicable social and linguistic
conventions.”178 Many people governed by a statute will not be
conversant with its applicable linguistic conventions—much
less the social conventions governing its enactment, such as
the complex procedures of Congress.179
Relatedly, non-standard language use by people governed
by American statutes will not be represented in the corpora
legal corpus analysts prefer, which lean toward published or
broadcast material that has gone through an editorial pro176
See supra note 81 (discussing an example of textualist reliance on the
supposed understandings of ordinary readers of a statute).
177
This gives textualists something in common with the poststructuralist literary critics who announced the “death of the author.” See generally ROLAND
BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT 142, 142 (Stephen Heath
trans., 1977) (“[W]riting is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin.
Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away,
the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body
writing.”) For both, “it is language which speaks, not the author.” Id. at 143.
Poststructuralists saw the author’s irrelevance as proof of a text’s radical indeterminacy: “a text is not . . . the ‘message’ of the Author-God . . . but a multidimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and
clash.” Id. at 146. Textualists see the opposite: the fixation of meaning. For
textualists, ignoring the speaker of a legislative text enacts a normative democratic commitment to limiting legal power to the enacted text: “our Constitution
provides for the enactment and approval of texts, not of intents.” Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 82
(2017).
178
Manning, supra note 80, at 96.
179
See, e.g., BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE
PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS xiii (5th ed. 2016) (arguing that even most “U.S.
government textbooks” fail to capture the complex realities of contemporary Congressional procedure).

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-6\CRN604.txt

1436

unknown

Seq: 40

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

26-OCT-21

9:27

[Vol. 106:1397

cess.180 The United States is home to many people who speak
English in variants other than standard American English,
such as African American English (AAE).181 Recent research
indicates that such speakers are severely disadvantaged in the
legal setting, not only because of enduring structural racial
inequities but, at the basic level of linguistic comprehension.
One study, for instance, found that court reporter transcriptions of AAE were far less accurate than those of standard
English.182 When asked to paraphrase AAE utterances, court
reporters got it wrong over three quarters of the time.183 Yet
AAE is ordinary speech for an important section of the American public.184
Legal corpus proponents’ search for ordinary meaning
rests on the democratic legitimacy of looking to people governed by law. Yet for the most part, legal corpus users have
excluded both those who produce laws and those marginalized
by them. Instead they tend to study speakers whose relevance
to legal interpretation they have not justified or even
explored.185
There is one area in which this has not been the case: when
analyzing constitutional, as opposed to statutory, text, scholars have turned to language resembling that of the Constitu180
Phillips & Egbert, supra note 3, at 1603 (“The five register categories included in COCA represent only a very small fraction of the many registers in the
English language. While it is somewhat common for Americans to encounter
these registers, especially when reading, it is extremely uncommon for Americans
to actually participate in the production of these texts. Most Americans will never
publish a fiction novel or an article for a magazine, newspaper, or academic
journal, and most will never appear on a televised or radio talk show. Moreover,
the registers in which English language users do spend the vast majority of their
time (e.g., interpersonal conversations, phone calls, text messages, emails, letters,
personal notes, etc.) are typically ignored by corpus compilers.”).
181
See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AFRICAN AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1–2
(Jennifer Bloomquist, Lisa J. Green & Sonja Lanehart eds., 2015) (discussing
African American Language as a recognized version of English); CORAAL, ONLINE
RESOURCES FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN LANGUAGE, https://oraal.uoregon.edu/coraal
[https://perma.cc/BA6B-D4DW] (last visited Mar. 28, 2021) (providing a corpus
of African American Language use); Taylor Jones, What is AAVE?, LANGUAGEJONES
(Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.languagejones.com/blog-1/2014/6/8/what-isaave [https://perma.cc/TA3G-EE23] (explaining some grammatical hallmarks of
African American Language).
182
Taylor Jones, Jessica Rose Kalbfeld, Ryan Hancock & Robin Clark, Testifying While Black: An Experimental Study of Court Reporter Accuracy in Transcription
of African American English, 95 LANGUAGE e216, e226 (2019).
183
Id.
184
See, e.g., CORAAL, supra note 181 (providing a corpus of African American
Language use).
185
See Zoldan, supra note 5, at 415–16 (noting that, in some cases, courts
arbitrarily pick which “extratextual materials” are used to define a statutory
term).
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tion or produced by the same people, using sources like the
Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA).186 The
COFEA includes, inter alia, records of the Constitutional Convention and state ratification debates; early “federal and state
statutes, executive department reports, and legal treatises”;
and “official documents, diaries and personal letters written by
and to” “George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Hamilton, and James Madison.”187
As an initial matter, it is not clear why looking to debates,
statutes, and other writings by those who wrote the Constitution are valid, but looking to similar texts by those who write
statutes is not. This strange inconsistency is reminiscent,
though, of the relationship between statutory textualists and
constitutional originalists. Textualists eschew information
about the process through which a statute was enacted and the
people who participated in that process, while originalists,
their close cousins, tend to value statements by the founders
about how the Constitution was supposed to function, ratification discussions, and other non-constitutional text by those
related with the document.
At the same time, corpus-based analyses of constitutional
text are subject to the same pitfalls as those focused on statutes. Take a prominent study focused on the Appointments
Clause’s provision that a president “shall nominate, and . . .
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law.”188 In a
wide-ranging article analyzing both contemporaneous linguistic usage and early practices, Jennifer Mascott concluded that
the founding generation treated as officers a far greater swath
of federal employees than the current administrative state
does. She stated her conclusion in a categorical interpretation
of the Constitution’s one true meaning: “If a statute authorizes
186
See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham & Jesse Egbert, Scientific Methods for
Analyzing Original Meaning: Corpus Linguistics and the Emoluments Clauses 5–8
(Ga. St. U. College of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2019-02, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3321438 [https://perma.cc/VPD9-LTMV] (arguing
that interpretation of the world “emolument” in the Constitution should be understood by the original meaning of the time) (the Corpus of Founding Era America
English (COFEA) is available at https://lawncl.byu.edu/ [https://perma.cc/
UZ65-Y86F]); Mascott, supra note 3, at 466 (arguing that the word “officer” in the
Constitution should be understood through the “original public meaning” of the
term).
187
Cunningham & Egbert, supra note 186, at 6–7.
188
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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the federal government to complete a task or exercise a power,
the individual who maintains ongoing responsibility for the
task or power is an officer.”189
The Article was so persuasive that two Supreme Court Justices would have adopted its findings into law.190 Yet, like
much legal corpus literature, this work focuses on one particular word as though it were an inert object. And it presumes,
rather than justifies, the notion that contemporaneous usage
by some set of people determines an utterance’s meaning forever. These very assumptions are undermined by the Appointments Clause’s own phrasing, which makes officer status
relational: it requires presidential appointment and Senate
consent for those established as officers by law. In other
words, the context of the whole sentence suggests that whether
someone is an officer depends on what Congress thinks about
it. Evidence of early practice may thus reveal what early Congresses thought about the positions they created, without
showing what they thought constituted officers as a class in
perpetuity.191 This legal corpus analysis, thus, builds in assumptions about word meaning that are belied by linguistics
research, which has shown that a couple of words is rarely a
useful unit of linguistic analysis.192 And it builds in normative
commitments to the primacy of original meaning. Even when
couched in empirical terms, though, such commitments remain political, not linguistic. As with much legal corpus analysis, it’s not that the empirical investigation is not interesting or
revealing. It just seems to address a question slightly—but
importantly—different from the one it claims to pose.

189

Mascott, supra note 3, at 454.
Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056–57 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating, in a concurrence joined by Justice Gorsuch, that the Court should adopt
the broad definition of “officer” offered in Mascott, supra note 3).
191
Cf. E. Garrett West, Congressional Power over Office Creation, 128 YALE L.J.
166, 221 (2018) (arguing that “(1) only ‘delegated sovereign authority’—or, duties
that ‘alter legal rights or obligations on behalf of the United States’—can be
sufficient to create ‘officer’ status; and (2) to determine whether the officer exercises this ‘sovereign authority,’ judges must look to both the statute that ‘established [the office] by Law’ and [any] regulations . . . that subdelegate
responsibilities to that officer”) (first alteration in original) (internal citations
omitted).
192
See Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Empiricism, 40 STATUTE L.
REV. 13, 20 (2019) (“With philosophy of language and linguistics, the typical focus
is on the sentence as the relevant unit of meaning.”).
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C. Genres
Like audiences and speakers, language use itself tends to
come in clumps: scholars of language have long recognized the
crucial role of genre. As the influential literary theorist Mikhail
Bakhtin put it, “[e]ach separate utterance is individual, of
course, but each sphere in which language is used develops its
own relatively stable types of . . . utterances.”193 That is, patterns of language use develop within particular institutional
settings, lending some coherence and consistency to the language of each sphere even as it evolves through the ongoing
production and interaction of utterances.194
Such “intertextual relationships between a particular text
and prior discourse,” the linguistic anthropologists Charles
Briggs and Richard Bauman have written, “play a crucial role
in shaping form, function, discourse structure, and meaning”
as well as “in building competing perspectives on what is taking
place” both in the utterance and in the world.195 Intertextual
relations solidify genres and set up audience expectations: they
push speakers to conform to particular patterns and bring into
play canonical forms of argument and legitimation developed
within that genre.196 “As soon as we hear a generic framing
device, such as ‘once upon a time,’ we unleash a set of expectations regarding narrative forms and content.”197 Intertextual
relations and the genres they facilitate thus both link utterances to particular spheres of meaning and orientations to the
world, and “afford[ ] great power for naturalizing both texts and
the cultural reality that they represent.”198 And they come suf193
M.M. BAKHTIN, The Problem of Speech Genres, in SPEECH GENRES AND OTHER
LATE ESSAYS 60, 60 (Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist eds., Vern W. McGee
trans., 1986).
194
See ASIF AGHA, LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL RELATIONS 1–5 (2007) (exploring the
mutually constitutive relationship between language patterns and a range of social institutions); M.M. BAKHTIN, Discourse in the Novel, in THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS 259, 278 (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael
Holquist trans., 1982). “For the writer,” Bakhtin wrote, any “object reveals first of
all precisely the socially heteroglot multiplicity of its names, definitions and value
judgments,” a “multitude of routes, roads and paths that have been laid down in
the object by social consciousness” and the “unfolding of social heteroglossia
surrounding the object,” that is, the texts that have gone before and that coexist
with the writer. Id. This “dialogic orientation,” moreover, is “a property of any
discourse.” Id. at 279.
195
Charles L. Briggs & Richard Bauman, Genre, Intertextuality, and Social
Power, 2 J. LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 131, 147 (1992).
196
See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 75, 75–76 (1991) (providing a typology of canonical argumentation moves
used to legitimize legal conclusions).
197
Briggs & Bauman, supra note 195, at 147.
198
Id. at 148.
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fused with implicit claims: “by invoking a particular genre, producers of discourse assert (tacitly or explicitly) that they
possess the authority needed to decontextualize discourse that
bears . . . historical and social connections and to recontextualize it in [a new] discursive setting.”199
Linguists analyze a given genre through corpora containing
examples of it. So, to make claims about everyday conversation, a scholar would analyze corpora of everyday conversation,
and to make claims about academic writing, she would analyze
corpora of academic writing. To understand how a term or
phenomenon that appears in one genre works in another, the
scholar would do a comparison. So, to understand how lexical
bundles work in academic writing and everyday conversation, a
scholar would analyze corpora of each and compare how the
linguistic feature appears in them.
Legal corpus linguistics, instead, undertakes non-comparisons. It takes a linguistic feature—usually a word or two—
from a statute, and tracks how that feature appears in a corpus
of some sort of non-legal English. It does not evaluate how the
word works in the language of statutes, statute-producers, or
statute-implementers. It just looks at the word in the non-legal
language corpus.200 But, as a legal interpretation methodology, it still makes claims about legal language, though by looking at corpora of non-legal language.201
Imagine a similar study in linguistics. Say a scholar takes
a word bundle found in an academic article and tracks how it
appears in a corpus of conversational English. That research
might contribute to our understanding of conversational English. But the scholar could not claim to say much about academic English. She could note that the word bundle appeared
in an academic article, but having not analyzed a corpus of
academic writing, she would have no findings about how the
word bundle functioned there.
Legal writers performing legal corpus work, in contrast,
routinely claim or imply that this kind of non-comparison does
tell us something important about legal English.202 Since the
199

Id.
See Zoldan, supra note 5, at 441 (stating that users of legal corpus to
interpret statutes “focus[ ], virtually exclusively, on searches in general corpora”).
201
The exception has been legal corpus analysis of constitutional text, which
has utilized corpora of statutes, ratification debates, and other genres closely
related to that of the Constitution. See supra notes 186-191 and accompanying
text.
202
Cf. Zoldan, supra note 5 , at 424–25 (arguing that using a nonlegal corpora
does not reveal how terms are used in a legal context).
200
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corpus they look to does not represent the legal language they
make claims about, readers are asked to agree that the surveyed genre should be the genre we look to, that the speakers
represented there should inform our understanding of the law,
that these texts’ audiences should be the ones we look to in
interpreting legal words. The relevance of the analysis, in other
words, rests on normative underpinnings. But in legal corpus
analysis, such normative claims often masquerade as empirical findings.
One could argue that large corpora such as the COCA eliminate the influence of genres: they provide evidence of a healthy
mixture of genres, allowing interpreters to see what a term
means in a broad range of settings and avoiding privileging one
over others. Yet there are dangers to mixing genres. For instance, both academic and conversational American English
have lexical bundles, but each uses them differently.203 We
may not care about this genre-based distinction; we may just
be interested in how lexical bundles function in English generally. But there might not be a uniform pattern of lexical bundles across English usage: the patterns may simply be genrebased. If that is the case, our search for a consistent throughline across pragmatic contexts may conflate different patterns
rather than reveal any particular one. It may tell us less about
lexical bundles in English and more about whether the corpus
has more academic text or more conversation transcripts.204
Having lots of data can be useful, but it can also muddy an
analysis, leading people to conflate different data that indicate
distinct phenomena.205
Not distinguishing genres, and lacking a theory that explains which genres are relevant, leads legal corpus work to
make findings that may be interesting, but are not clearly related to the legal questions that inspire the research. For example, the corpora preferred by legal corpus studies usually

203

See supra Part II.
Phillips & Egbert, supra note 3, at 1603 (“[R]egister variation cannot be
ignored regardless of the size of a corpus. Moreover, . . . a corpus could comprise
a set of texts that, taken together, are too heterogeneous to represent any one
linguistic population.”).
205
See H. James Norton & James Divine, Simpson’s Paradox . . . and How To
Avoid It, 2015 SIGNIFICANCE 40, 40–42 (2015) (explaining that “when data from two
or more groups are combined, patterns previously seen in the data can reverse or
disappear altogether” because “a background factor” acts as “a confounder,”
which occurs when “[t]he groups differ on the background factor [and t]he background factor influences the outcome variable”).
204
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skew toward written text.206 But if one wants to uncover how
ordinary speakers would use the words in a statute, it is not
obvious that published, edited texts would be the most illuminating choice. One might prefer something like the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (SBCSA),207 which
records naturally occurring interactions, to show how American English is used in informal settings. The SBCSA includes
transcriptions of kitchen table discussions, classroom instruction, forest walks, and so on. It is particularly valuable because it includes information about the contexts in which the
speech it records occurs. Such contexts play a crucial role in
pragmatics, that is, the social situations in which communication happens, which form a central part of linguistic
meaning.208
The Santa Barbara corpus has its limitations. It is necessarily smaller than corpora created by web crawling software.
And it contains the interactions only of people who have agreed
to participate in the project. Larger corpora like the NOW and
the COCA, though, hardly solve this demographic limitation.
For instance, the popular NOW corpus continually collects English-language news articles from around the internet. This
does give it a large demographic scope: it includes articles from
Nigeria, Hong Kong, and other English-speaking populations.
Much of that demographic diversity, however, is largely irrelevant to determining the meanings that American statutory
terms have for the Americans they rule. Within the American
data, this corpus records things written for publication, usually produced through an editorial process. The COCA similarly skews toward published work.209
Perhaps the published, edited work these corpora contain
does present a good representation of ordinary meaning. As
Stephen Mouritsen and Justice Thomas Lee, two major proponents of legal corpus linguistics, have written, “Since we are
interpreting a written text [the statute], evaluating that text
206
See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text (describing the corpora
favored by legal corpus linguistics); see also Zoldan, supra note 5, at 403 (defining
corpus linguistics as a methodology of studying “data in bodies of text”).
207
See SBCSA, supra note 21.
208
Michael Silverstein, supra note 77, at 129–30 (arguing that the part of
language use in which speakers refer to and make assertions about things in the
world through semantically constant meanings “is a special case” of language use,
located within a broader category of language as “a form of social action, a meaning-dependent and meaning-generating activity” whose significance rests on its
pragmatic context of use).
209
The COCA also includes some spoken language, also produced and edited
for broadcast. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
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through the lens of standard written American English . . . may
be the right approach.”210 Legal corpus users clearly agree:
these studies have all used corpora of language produced and
edited for public consumption, primarily in written form. On
this view, what constitutes “ordinary” language for legal interpreters should be not quite the language of the governed—
spoken or unedited written text—but language that is somewhat similar to statutes in its style and pragmatics of production. And the formal, edited, published American English of
popularly available publications certainly comes closer to the
language of statutes than everyday conversational American
English does.
But why stop there? If we want language that resembles
statutes, there are plenty of other options. The Congressional
Record is the official transcript of many legislative utterances.
C-SPAN records many live communicative interactions in Congress. Congressional committee reports are closely related to
the statutes they discuss. Administrative agencies propose legislation in language that resembles it. These sources all come
closer to statutes in both style and production pragmatics than
National Geographic or Jerry Springer. Looking to corpora like
this would bring legal corpus studies into closer alignment with
corpus linguistics in linguistics, which analyzes how language
works in a given genre by studying corpora of that genre, rather
than other genres. Instead, legal corpus analysts have shied
away from studying the genre whose meanings they seek to
illuminate.
The natural defense for this choice is that ordinary language is the normatively appropriate evidentiary base for the
interpretation of statutes.211 That is a widely accepted, or at
least a widely repeated, principle of legal interpretation. But an
actually empirical approach would examine the assumption,
not take it as given. After all, legal language differs from nonlegal language in some fairly obvious ways. Take, for instance,
statutes. They are, to start with, really difficult to follow. Their
phraseology is convoluted, with overstuffed sentences, comically long qualifiers, and cross-reference mazes. Their syntax,
in short, is weird. So is their information flow. Statutes utterly
fail to conform to Preferred Argument Structure, packing new
information into every available clause as though Congress
were running out of paper. They do not indicate the weight,
210
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 3, at 834. This is a rather half-hearted defense of a methodological choice that is central to the whole project.
211
Id.
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credence, or value audiences should grant particular assertions—the sort of thing that speakers do indicate through semantic prosody.
Moreover, both the way statutes are produced and the effects they have are unique. No ordinary utterance is created
quite like the byzantine, multi-player exquisite corpse creations that form our law. And nothing but law imposes quite
the same constraints or embroils us in quite the same arcane
system of regulation and litigation. Their pragmatics are as
weird as their syntax.212
Legal corpus linguistics proponents seem unconcerned
with the syntactic and pragmatic distance between statutes
and the language uses of corpora like COCA and NOW. Perhaps they assume that semantics—the stable part of word
meaning—will save the day. But statutes often use words in
very odd ways. A statute might use an existing word for a new
object (“Exchange” for health insurance marketplace).213 Or it
might take a specialized word and define it to mean something
more ordinary (“taking” not just as common-law hunting or
trapping but as anything that “harms” animals).214 And so on.
More importantly, though, if we are going to be realistic
about the distribution of terms in a corpus, it is odd to be so
unrealistic about the role of semantics in language. Semantics
is only a subset of communicative function; semantic meaning
often depends on syntactic and pragmatic contexts. Take a
sentence like, “There shall be allowed as a credit against the tax
imposed by this chapter” a certain amount of money per barrel
of “[o]il produced from . . . tar sands.”215 As a statute, it issues
a command to the government. But in most communicative
contexts, speakers do not have the option of issuing commands
to the government.216 In most situations, this sentence may
instead offer a prediction: “this is what will happen,” not “this
is what you must do.” The word “shall” would stay the same;
but as the context changed so would its meaning.
212

Silverstein, supra note 77, at 129–30.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2018); see
also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015).
214
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2018); see also Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 690–93 (1995).
215
Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 182 F.3d 212, 215 n. 5 (3d Cir.
1999) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 29 (2000) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 45K (2018)))
(emphasis added).
216
Even when a speaker is in a position to issue a command, the verb “shall”
is not the idiomatic way to do it in most situations.
213
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Statutory language, in sum, differs in many important
ways from the non-statutory language that the most popular
contemporary corpora collect. Looking for terminological frequencies in one may thus have little to teach us about the
other.
Moreover, people predictably approach statutes differently
than they approach everyday conversations, newspapers, or TV
shows. Few readers would mistake the Wall Street Journal for
the Internal Revenue Code. Law is more or less sui generis, so
its social effects do not much resemble those of everyday conversations, newspapers, and so on. So, for instance, a recent
survey study by James Macleod asked how a demographically
representative sample of people in the United States understood causation requirements in various statutes.217 Recognizing the difference between using language and
understanding it, Macleod did not ask how (if at all) survey
respondents used words like “causation,” “but-for cause,” or
“proximate cause” in their own speech. Rather, Macleod asked
what respondents understood causation terms to mean in the
context of particular situations.218
In other words, how people understand statutory language
may be quite different from how they themselves speak. Genre
distinctions are not just for linguists; audiences recognize and
react to them too. We orient ourselves differently to different
kinds of utterances. If we want to know not just how an ordinary person might use a word, but what they might think it
means when they encounter it, this poses a problem for legal
corpus analysis. Mining repositories of conversations, newspapers, or media appearances does not necessarily reveal how
people orient themselves to statutes. Legal corpus work’s empirical findings thus rest on fictions about how people read and
use the language in statutes. This half-empirical attitude obscures both how statutes are demarcated as a linguistic genre,
and how they function as a social force.
Legal corpus proponents may object that they make no
normative claims; they merely provide judges information
about how an ordinary speaker would understand statutory
terms. As I have explained, though, they cannot hope to do so
by looking at how a word that appears in a statute works in
other contexts. That is because the same word is likely to have
a different social life in a novel than in a statute, and because
217
James A. Macleod, Ordinary Causation: A Study in Experimental Statutory
Interpretation, 94 IND. L.J. 957, 962–63 (2019).
218
Id.
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ordinary speakers and audiences are themselves attuned to
such genre distinctions. More importantly, legal corpus work
routinely fails to even discuss issues of speaker, audience, and
genre; nor does it usually disclose the limited nature of the
information it can provide for the normative, performative work
of legal interpretation. In other words, it provides some information about its object of analysis but does not address what
that information can reasonably be taken to mean. Instead, by
presenting its analysis as though it provided a clear and certain
answer to the questions judges face, legal corpus analysis typically implies that it is both a relevant and a reliable basis for
legal interpretation.
One might also argue that, for all its failings, legal corpus
inquiry at least tells us more about ordinary language usage
than dictionaries, which judges sometimes turn to for this information.219 Dictionaries do give extremely limited information about word meaning,220 not least because their definitions
are acontextual. Corpus inquiry is obviously more context-rich
than a dictionary. But, as I have explained, the utility of context depends on its quality as much as its quantity: it is not
clear how much benefit, for instance, an irrelevant context
gives to interpretation. When the analyst explains and justifies
the study’s methodological choices, readers can evaluate the
utility and the sufficiency of the contexts it includes. But legal
corpus studies routinely fail to offer such explanations and
justifications. Moreover, it may well be that both dictionaries
and legal corpus analysis are not great options for legal interpretation. There are plenty of other ways to interpret legal
texts; we need not choose between just these two.221
Finally, legal corpus proponents may object that they are
merely doing what judges want them to do: finding the ordinary
meaning of legal words. But the fact that judges are often
wrong about language—conflating speakers, audiences, and
genres; treating words as though they had acontextual meanings—argues for a legal corpus linguistics that is more, not
less, explicit about its methodological choices and realistic
about its limitations.

219
See James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme
Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 483, 487 n.6 (2013).
220
See, e.g., Mouritsen, supra note 3, at 1937 (discussing the cognitive limits
of dictionary editors).
221
See infra notes 241–242 and accompanying text.
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D. Conclusion
While corpus linguists working in linguistics use analyze
the language patterns in their chosen corpora of speakers, audience, and genre, legal corpus linguistics usually aims to analyze legal language through unrelated corpora of non-legal
speakers, audiences, and genres. This might fit the textualist
preference for seeking the meanings that statutes’ audiences
would attribute to them. Yet this substantial departure from
corpus linguistics’ methodology renders legal corpus linguistics a different kind of inquiry. Corpus linguistics in linguistics
depends on an empirical claim: that the corpus represents the
language analyzed. Legal corpus linguistics, in contrast, depends on a normative claim: that the corpus represents the
language that should guide our understanding of the—quite
separate—language of the law.
One might counter that legal corpus linguistics does not
depend on this normative claim, because it can remain agnostic as to what meaning a court ought to give a statutory term.
On this argument, a legal corpus inquiry simply provides information about how the words appearing in statutes also appear
in non-statutory contexts. Legal interpreters can then do what
they want with that information.
Fair enough. But in that case, what is it that legal corpus
linguistics contributes to legal interpretation? It eschews the
language of legislative drafters, so it cannot show how legislative speakers used a term. It looks to utterances in non-legal
genres, so it cannot show how an audience understands a term
appearing in a legal genre. It can, of course, demonstrate how
some people, in some contexts, use a term that also happens to
appear in a statute. But, limited as it is to non-comparisons, it
cannot show how these non-legal usages relate to legal terms.
Again and again, legal corpus analysis only becomes relevant
once we accept a host of fictions—about audiences, speakers,
and genres; about the value of non-comparison; and about the
possibility of certainty about meaning. With its half-empirical
approach, legal corpus linguistics tends to do half the work,
but claim twice the results.
IV
TOWARD A MORE EMPIRICAL ATTITUDE
Legal corpus linguistics takes aim at a legal fiction: the
“ordinary speaker” who helps justify judicial opinions’ interpretive conclusions. It treats this legal fiction as an empirical
question: rather than assume how imagined ordinary speakers
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must use language, we should investigate how real ordinary
speakers actually do it. I have argued that this empirical impulse, commendable though it may be, falters on its own limited scope. It routinely ignores the basic decisions that
characterize corpus linguistic inquiry, such as which tools are
best for a particular inquiry; which genres are relevant; which
speakers and which addressees count; how utterance production relates to utterance understanding; and, indeed, what it is
that corpus analysis can be claimed to reveal. While aiming for
a realistic description of how some people use some words,
legal corpus linguistics neglects the contexts that are key to
any actually empirical linguistic investigation.
In linguistics scholarship, such decisions don’t just influence the research; they more or less are the research. Academic papers in corpus linguistics routinely spend most of
their time explaining, justifying, and hedging about methodological and interpretive choices.222 Such choices are not optional: every corpus inquiry makes such decisions, whether or
not its authors discuss them, recognize them, or outsource
them to others. Any legal corpus analysis should therefore be
able to defend those decisions on empirical grounds. And because interpreting statutes inevitably implicates questions of
democratic legitimacy, it needs to have a normative justification too.
The preceding Parts outlined some of the key failings in
contemporary legal corpus linguistics, but the method could
still have real utility both to the practice of law and to our
theorizations of it. This Part discusses how legal scholars and
practitioners can harness the impulses of corpus linguistics
while preserving, rather than abandoning, the empirical attitude it requires.
A. About Legal Language
Corpus analysis could help clarify what sets legal language
apart. Instead of non-comparisons that ask how legal terms
appear in non-legal language, legal corpus researchers could
do actual comparisons, like actual linguists. This could help
legal interpreters understand how given terms are used in different settings; elaborate on how a term usually appears in
legal contexts; and address the contingencies in determining
222
See, e.g., sources collected supra subpart I.A (discussing the role corpus
linguistics serves within the linguistics discipline).
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whether a term is “ordinary” or a “legal term of art.”223 This
kind of comparison could also illuminate how words move between different realms, taking on new meanings that they carry
with them into new settings—such as the word “Exchange,”
which did not refer to a government-run marketplace for private health insurance before the Affordable Care Act,224 yet can
now carry that meaning even in non-legal contexts.
Even more importantly, legal corpus analysts could follow
the lead of linguistics and move beyond individual words and
word pairs. After all, what makes statutes so odd is not just
their terminology but also their syntactic and prosodic structure. Corpus analysis could, for instance, detail how legal language compares to the language of other genres. How are
topics maintained through the winding threads of run-on
sentences and cross-references that characterize statutes, and
how does that differ from the way that newspapers, novels, or
conversations perform that function? How do laws pick out
their primary addressees—those they authorize or constrain —
and how does that compare to other written texts?
Such inquiries could give us insight into aspects of legal
language that remain hidden in plain sight—the kind of revelation corpus linguistics in linguistics excels at. And this need
not be a purely academic exercise. Combining this kind of
analysis with other linguistics research could have practical
benefits for legal drafting. Scholars could clarify how statutory
drafters could better approximate the kind of English that people outside the government might be able to understand, while
retaining the order and precision that statutes require. Rules
of thumb like “introduce only one new piece of information per
clause”—cribbed from Preferred Argument Structure findings
about how people usually talk—could help harried congressional staffers edit their work.225 The notion that judicial and
scholarly approaches to statutory interpretation should “pro-

223
See Bernstein, supra note 13, at 463 (“There is no consensus on how to
determine when a word is just a word, and when it is a legal term of art.”).
224
See supra, note 81 and accompanying text.
225
See supra subpart I.A. The same could go for regulatory drafting. See
BLAKE EMERSON & CHERYL BLAKE, ADMIN. CONF. U.S., PLAIN LANGUAGE IN REGULATORY
DRAFTING 2–3 (2017). Of course, Congressional staffers tend to be pretty fluent
speakers of American English themselves, so their failure to write statutes in an
easily comprehensible style probably arises from factors other than lack of competence. Still, scholars propounding clear, discrete guidelines for producing comprehensible statutes might nudge drafters to treat that goal as more important
and attainable than they have in the past.
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mote clearer drafting” crops up often in textualist writing.226
Here is an opportunity to actually do so.
Comparing statutory language with other genres could also
help legal thinkers evaluate and revise the canons of construction that play such an important role in contemporary statutory interpretation.227 Canons, though popular, present real
problems for legal interpretation. Different canons can lead to
different interpretations of the same legal language, but, lacking an agreed-upon preference order, canons cannot help determine which result is better.228 And because there is also no
consensus on what it is that canons are supposed to accomplish, it is impossible to evaluate how good any given canon is
at doing its job or to compare its “strength” to that of
another.229
Yet, linguistic canons of construction are still supposed to
guide judges as they interpret statutory language. Some commentators even claim that linguistic canons of interpretation
express widely-shared “presumptions about what an intelligently produced text conveys.”230 If that is the case, then linguistic canons should “stand or fall by their accuracy in
reflecting relevant linguistic practices.”231 Corpus linguistic inquiry allows scholars to evaluate canons against actual, rather
than imagined, relevant linguistic practices.232 Such research
might reveal that some canons do not actually reflect any nonlegal linguistic practices. Consider, for example, whether the
226

SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 79, at 51.
See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on
the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1302 (2018) (finding, based on interviews with federal judges,
that “[t]he younger judges [in the study], most of whom were educated under the
modern legislation curriculum, were generally more focused on, and accepting of,
the canons of construction” as compared with older judges).
228
Bernstein, supra note 13, at 480 (“If there is no default rule for deciding
which rule to use, even judges who strive to obey the law of interpretation are
bound to reach conclusions that are unpredictable and inconsistent.”); see also
id. at 478 (“Even as great a fan of rules, Justice Scalia has written that ‘[e]ach
[canon] may be overcome by the strength of differing principles that point in other
directions,’ but given no indication of what ‘strength’ would look like or how a
judge should assess it.”) (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 77, at 59–60)
(alternation in original).
229
Id.
230
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 79, at 51.
231
Baude & Sachs, supra note 12, at 1084.
232
In a related move, scholars have recently begun investigating canons of
construction using survey methods. See generally Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum
& Victoria Nourse, Statutory Interpretation from the Outside, 122 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (surveying a sample of U.S. English speakers to evaluate
“which traditional canon’s ‘ordinary meaning’ actually supports”).
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rule against surplusage governs everyday conversation or published writing. That may argue for abandoning such canons, or
for developing new canons that reflect legislative practice—the
accuracy of which corpus analysis could help assess.
Relatedly, one could study similarities and differences between statutory language and utterances closely related in personnel or social context, such as the language of congressional
hearings, committee reports, agency regulations, and other
places where the political branches communicate with themselves, one another, or the public. Such comparison could help
specify how legislative and administrative plans are translated
into statutory language, and how statutory language is explicated and discussed by the people who craft, enact, and implement it.
Illuminating how the phrasing and explanation of statutory
terminology change from genre to genre, and how those who
write and those who implement statutes deploy language,
would be one way to use corpus linguistics to dismantle, rather
than enable, the fictions that dominate legal interpretation.
This could give real insight into the democratic process of enacting and implementing laws, and would likely identify interesting patterns in how meaning is conveyed across the political
branches.
Tracking distinctions between legal and other kinds of English may also spur more attention to an enduring, but underappreciated, difficulty in legal interpretation: the issue of notice. Legal interpretation discussions often assume that the
interpreter’s job is to approximate the meaning that people
with no relevant training or experience would give the statute.233 But it is quite likely that many speakers would have
difficulty giving any meaning to much of the United States
Code. “Anecdotal evidence suggests that most seasoned statutory players start with the section-by-section [summaries provided in committee reports] to understand the point of each
section,” and only then “turn[ ] to what is often the dense and
unintelligible . . . minutiae of the statutory text.”234 If even
233
See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 2193, 2194 (2017) (“[Textualists] approach language from the perspective of an ordinary English speaker—a congressional outsider. . . . What
matters to the textualist is how the ordinary English speaker—one unacquainted
with the peculiarities of the legislative process—would understand the words of a
statute.”).
234
Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways that Courts Can Improve on What They
Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 209 (2017).
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“seasoned statutory players” can’t figure out what a statute
means, how are “ordinary speakers”—whoever they might be —
supposed to?
Legal corpus linguistics could thus usefully challenge legal
interpretation’s frequent assertions that ordinary speakers
would understand legal text in some particular way. Corpus
research could help writers show that it is quite likely that
many—perhaps most—people governed by a given statute
would have difficulty attributing any meaning to it. Using a
method that gives insight into how various groups actually use
and approach language may help clarify the limitations of ordinary language in evaluating the meaning of statutes.
The contention that the law provides notice of its contents
to a general public may itself operate as a legal fiction—invoked
as an almost religious counterfactual repeated insistently in
the face of experience and evidence that are almost uniformly
contrary. Perhaps it is time to address that contradiction, and
to face the democratic qualms it should cause. Legal corpus
linguistics could encourage legal interpreters to take a novel
interest in how the very people for whom they often express an
abstract solicitude actually experience the law.
B. About Legal Interpretation
Legal corpus linguistics could also spur some productive
reflection on the role that ordinary meaning and ordinary people—however defined—should play in legal interpretation. The
legal profession has never settled on what constitutes relevantly ordinary language, who its speakers are, or how to properly relate law with other genres.235 And legal writing does not
usually present assertions about ordinary language as falsifiable claims subject to empirical verification. All this raises the
question of whether empirical convictions really drive most invocations of ordinary language.
After all, when judges interpret a legal text, they do not
report on some preexisting, empirically verifiable meaning.
They constitute and implement the text’s meaning; they give the
legal text a force in the world.236 To “say what the law is,” as
Justice Marshall surely recognized, is a speech act: it lays
down what the law shall be.237 Empirical evidence of how some
people use one or two words is of limited assistance in making
such inherently normative legal decisions.
235
236
237

See supra Part III.
See supra note 174 (discussing speech acts, or performative utterances).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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Assertions about ordinary language in legal interpretation,
in short, may often be not so much empirical claims as normative ones. They assert the reasonableness of the writer’s conclusions or the clarity of the legal provision at issue. And they
are deployed not to provide sociolinguistic analysis, but to effectuate pragmatic effects on the world. This distinction may
help explain why even those who have taken up the empirical
mantle of legal corpus analysis routinely take the half-empirical route.238
Considering both the strengths and the limits of legal
corpus inquiry can also illuminate the inherent creativity of
legal interpretation. Legal interpretation tries to figure out
what a law means, but, as Richard Fallon has written, legal
writers use the notion of “meaning” to indicate a range of concepts.239 While corpus analysis can reveal how some people in
some social situations used some words at some times, the
nature of our legal system suggests that legal words do not
stand still. Statutes end up applying to new objects, in
changed social circumstances, in evolving legal and institutional contexts. Legal interpreters have to decide—on grounds
other than empirical language use—whether and how a law
should function in new settings. That fact undermines the idea
that ordinary usage as demonstrated in a corpus can yield
insight into the “real” meaning of a law.
In a recent Yale Law Journal article advocating legal
corpus linguistics, Thomas Lee and Stephen Mouritsen put
their view thus: “Our thesis is that words have meaning, and
that meaning can be theorized and measured using” tools from
linguistics.240 The claim is striking because it seems indisputable. But it is not quite accurate. Words do not “have” meaning the way, say, water has a chemical composition. Meaning
is not an essence that inheres in the word, traveling with it

238
See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 62, at 633–36 (arguing that statutory interpretation theory tends to treat normative commitments as though they expressed
empirical claims).
239
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications
for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1244–45 (2015) (“In
debates about legal meaning and interpretation, participants’ references to legal
meaning sometimes invoke or appeal to . . . : (1) semantic or literal meaning;
(2) contextual meaning as framed by shared presuppositions of speakers and
listeners . . . ; (3) real conceptual meaning; (4) intended meaning; (5) reasonable
meaning; and (6) interpreted meaning.”); see also Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of
“Meaning”, 7 MINN. STUD. PHIL. SCI. 131, 144 (1975) (describing a social division of
authority over various kinds of meaning).
240
Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 3, 795.
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across situations irrespective of its surroundings—H2O in a
drinking glass, H2O in a swimming pool, H2O in a raindrop.
No, unlike the chemical composition that water just has,
words develop meanings through their surroundings. Words
are one way people produce meanings together. And they are
not much use for that purpose when separated from related
meaning-making tools like syntax, prosody, markedness, paradigm sets, framing, and so on. Meaning is not a fact; it is a
social activity.
The more proponents imply that corpus analysis can reveal
some inherent, enduring meaning for statutory terms, the further they stray from the sort of thing that empirical research
can deliver, or even aims to achieve. Linguistics, and especially
the functional linguistics out of which corpus analysis grows,
studies the co-production of meaning by communicative participants. It cannot reveal an enduring, static meaning for a
statutory provision inherently subject to change through evolving legal, institutional, and social contexts. The empirical results of legal corpus analysis cannot rest on the fiction that
statutory language has one meaning subject to scientific
discovery.
CONCLUSION
Corpus linguistics is a powerful methodology for analyzing
the realities of language practice. But making it useful to the
rather different task of settling on meanings for legal texts
would require giving up some popular fictions. Most importantly, it would mean incorporating the contexts of legal text
into the analysis. A truly empirical attitude would not try to
evacuate legal texts of the hierarchies and genealogies that
create legal authority. It would not ignore the institutional circumstances that go into making legal texts the socially efficacious utterances they are. It would not pretend that legal
interpretation can be divorced from normative decisions about
practical implications. In other words, writers using corpus
linguistic methods should take into account both the legal and
the institutional contexts that crucially determine language
use and its effects in the legal environment.
A more empirical attitude would also imply other aspects of
empirical inquiry. Legal writers might be inspired to consider
the possibility that a well-formed question has no single correct
answer. There may be no one thing that a text means to a
relevant audience, no one way that a text instructs all audiences. Approaching the realities of language use as open tex-
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tured, multi-modal, and multivalent is, after all, what
linguistics does.
This method’s sudden popularity also raises the question:
why not others? If legal corpus proponents are interested in
the realities of the world that legal language works in, they can
team up with others who illuminate legislative and administrative realities. Recent scholarship has begun to uncover the
everyday practices—including the language practices—
through which legislation is produced and implemented. Like
legal corpus analysis, which looks to large data sets of many
speakers, this work emphasizes the importance of multiplicity.
It has clarified the wide diversity of people involved in statutory
production,241 and the text-producing, meaning-making
groups they form.242 It is odd, to say the least, for legal corpus
proponents to pay so much attention to words in unrelated
contexts but ignore how those words function in their native
environments.
Finally, empirical research about the workings of legal language should be placed in the context of empirical research on
the workings of law. Those drawn to legal corpus linguistics
should ask what other population-level information should influence their decision-making. Let us assume that sociological
facts about how people use a particular term should influence
our law. If that is so, it is hard to understand why sociological
facts about the effects of legal practices should not. How, for
instance, can we justify using empirical evidence about word
usage, but rejecting empirical evidence about race-based ineq241
Gluck & Bressman, supra note 164, at 906 (noting the attenuated relationship between statutory text and members of Congress, who “do not do the actual
drafting.”); Shobe, supra note 172, at 455 (2017) (“[A]gencies have their own
legislative counsel whose sole work is to review and draft legislation . . . .”).
242
See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1657–58 (2014) (discussing how judges, federal agencies, and the President engage in law making);
Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 119–20 (2012) (discussing how lawyers place
equal weight on all legislative history when convincing judges); see also Shobe,
supra note 172, at 455 (discussing how federal agencies impact the legislative
process); CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER, ADMIN. CONF. U.S., FEDERAL AGENCIES IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN STATUTORY DRAFTING 1 (2015) (“Federal
agencies draft statutes. Indeed, they are often the chief architects of the statutes
they administer.” (footnote omitted)). The normative valence of agency participation in legislation can vary across political views and even across democratic
cultures. In separate research with administrators in the recently democratized
country of Taiwan, for instance, I have found that administrators see agency
participation in legislation as enhancing the legitimacy of both. Anya Bernstein,
Porous Bureaucracy: Legitimating the Administrative State in Taiwan, 45 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 28, 43 (2020).
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uities in legal sanctions?243 If a corpus proponent feels that
the meaning of the law should be profoundly influenced by the
language habits of large populations unconnected to law’s production or implementation, it is worth asking why the legal
experiences of similar populations should not help define law
as well.
In sum, legal thinkers should explain rather than assume
the relevance of any particular empirical inquiry to legal interpretation. In legal corpus linguistics, this means evaluating
the language to be interpreted within its contexts; taking into
account how that language does things in the world; and recognizing how the analyst’s own participation in the research distributes power and possibility in contingent ways. It means, in
other words, taking the linguistics part of corpus linguistics as
seriously as the corpus part.

243
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 299 (1987) (holding that demonstrated
racial disparities in death penalty imposition did not violate legal equal protection
requirements).

